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ABSTRACT 
The Global Online Freedom Bill of 2006 emphasizes the importance 
of freedom of speech on the Internet as a fundamental human right. 
However, the backbone of the World Wide Web, the Internet domain 
name system, is a poor example of protecting free speech, 
particularly in terms of the balance between speech and commercial 
trademark interests. This is apparent from the manner in which the 
legislature and the judiciary deal with cases involving Internet 
gripe sites and parody sites. The lack of a clear consensus on the 
protection of free speech in these contexts is troubling, and can be 
found in a number of recent cases involving situations such as use 
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of the peta.org domain name for a parody site on the activities of 
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals; use of 
bosleymedical.com for a gripe site about the practices of the Bosley 
Medical Institute; and use of a misspelling of the Reverend Jerry 
Falwell’s last name (fallwell.com) for a website critical of the 
Reverend’s viewpoints on homosexuality. This Article examines how 
trademark law has come to trump freedom of expression under the 
domain name system and makes recommendations for regulatory 
reform to ensure a better balance of rights in the future. In 
particular, it suggests the development of presumptions against 
trademark infringement in cases clearly involving criticism or 
parody of a trademark holder in cyberspace. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We limit linguistic monopolies because ultimately we value the 
freedom to communicate above the freedom to own: the language of 
liberty is seldom heard where liberty of language has been removed 
from the commons.1 
Suppose that on graduating law school, you and your friends go out to 
celebrate at Selma’s Smokin’ Steakhouse. You have plans for a fun-filled 
evening of beer, baby back ribs, and lampooning your professors. 
However, when you get there, the service is terrible. The greeter is surly. 
The servers are extremely rude. The beer is lukewarm, and the fries are 
cold. When you complain to the manager, you’re told that they don’t 
appreciate complaints from “rowdy college kids.” 
As you have your whole summer ahead of you (BAR/BRI course 
aside), and you’re sitting around your apartment trying to avoid revisiting 
your Civ Pro notes, you decide to get back at Selma’s by setting up an 
online gripe site to describe your experiences there. You log on to an 
online domain name registration service and search for domain names you 
might use for this purpose. You discover that selmas.com is taken by a 
cookie manufacturer,2 but the following names are available: 
selmassmokinsteakhouse.com, selmassteakhouse.com, selmasstinks.com, 
selmassucks.com, selmassmokinsteakhousestinks.com, and, selmassmokin 
steakhousesucks.com. You could also register some intentional 
misspellings of relevant words and secure a domain name such as 
selmasstakehouse.com.  
You are not sure whether Selma’s Smokin’ Steakhouse has its own 
website or not, but it clearly does not use any of these domain names if it 
does. You decide to avoid selmasstinks.com and selmassucks.com for fear 
of upsetting the holder of the Selma’s Cookies trademark. However, you 
register the other domain names listed above for the purposes of your 
gripe site. Your site recounts your experiences at the steakhouse and 
invites others to post comments critical of the steakhouse. A couple of 
your friends post negative comments, and some other people on campus 
find out about the website and also post negative comments. One of the 
comments states: “You can get a much better steak at Selina’s Steakhouse. 
Don’t go to Selma’s. It sucks.” 
 
 
 1. Kevin Gray, Property in Thin Air, 50 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 252, 286 (1991). 
 2. This is, in fact, the case as of the date of writing. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Naturally, Selma (of the steakhouse fame) finds out about your website 
and asks you to remove it and transfer the relevant domain names to her. 
She even offers you $500 to do so. You have no intention of taking down 
the website or transferring the names to her, and, in response to the $500 
offer, you tell her, “It would take a lot more than that.” You intend this as 
an off-the-cuff comment rather than as an attempt to bargain for transfer of 
the names at a higher price, although in the back of your mind you wonder 
how much money she might give you to transfer the names. You do have a 
lot of student loans to pay back, after all. 
Finally, Selma sues you for trademark infringement3 of her Selma’s 
Smokin’ Steakhouse mark, and trademark dilution.4 She also brings a 
claim for infringement of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act 
(ACPA).5 Do her claims succeed? Does her property interest in the 
trademark outweigh your First Amendment right to criticize her in the 
forum you have chosen?6 That question is the focus of this article. 
Surprisingly, there is as yet no clear answer to it. This is partly a result of 
the variety of trademark-based actions that might apply here, including 
traditional trademark infringement, trademark dilution, and newer 
anticybersquatting regulations. Each kind of action embodies a different 
set of principles and balancing tests, and each implicates the protection of 
free speech against commercial trademark rights in a different way. 
In some ways, the following discussion is a necessary continuation of a 
dialogue about the appropriate role of trademark law vis-à-vis the First 
Amendment that began in the latter part of the twentieth century as 
trademark law began to expand into areas outside the traditional consumer 
confusion rationale.7 A number of commentators have noted that 
 
 
 3. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2000) (infringement of registered trademark rights); 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(a)(1) (2000) (infringement of unregistered trademark rights).  
 4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (2000). 
 5. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).  
 6. Trademarks are often colloquially referred to as property rights although technically they are 
not property in more traditional senses of the word. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks 
and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 788 (2004) (“[T]rademarks are not 
property rights in gross, but limited entitlements to protect against uses that diminish the informative 
value of marks,”); Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 
YALE L.J. 1687, 1687–88 (1999) (“Commentators and even courts increasingly talk about trademarks 
as property rights; as things valuable in and of themselves, rather than for the product goodwill they 
embody.”). 
 7. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 6, at 779–81 (noting that trademark law has expanded in two 
directions in recent years—the class of people who can be liable for trademark infringement has 
increased and there has been an expansion away from the traditional consumer confusion rationale for 
trademark law toward a more general preoccupation with whether a “challenged use diverts attention 
away from the trademark holder”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss6/1
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twentieth-century developments such as the dilution doctrine,8 the ability 
to merchandise trademarks per se separate from products to which they 
might originally have been affixed,9 the trend toward permitting 
assignments of trademarks in gross (without goodwill attached),10 the idea 
of “initial interest” confusion,11 and the development of anticybersquatting 
law and policy12 have turned trademarks into much stronger property 
rights than originally contemplated.13  
As trademark rights have broadened in scope, the tension between 
trademarks and free speech has intensified. When trademark rights were 
limited to the prevention of consumer confusion, free speech was less 
likely to be implicated.14 However, when trademarks are protected against 
 
 
 8. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (West Supp. 2006). Trademark dilution refers to blurring or 
tarnishing a trademark as distinct from confusing consumers as to the source of a particular product or 
service. See discussion in Part I.B.2 infra.  
 9. Lemley, supra note 6, at 1706–09 (noting, for example, that people buy hats and t-shirts 
because they have a famous logo emblazoned on them, and trademark law will protect licensing 
schemes around such uses of marks regardless of whether the trademark in question has any traditional 
trademark association with the hats or t-shirts). 
 10. See id. at 1709–10. Assigning a trademark in gross refers to the practice of selling a mark 
without the goodwill—in which its associate value generally lies—attached to the mark. 
 11. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 6, at 780–81 (“‘Initial interest confusion,’ which historically 
referred to a form of consumer confusion that occurred before the point of sale, has morphed into a 
standalone doctrine whose criteria bear little relationship to a traditional likelihood of confusion claim. 
Some courts have used the initial interest confusion doctrine to justify claims against virtually any use 
that temporarily diverts customers to a website not authorized by the trademark holder, regardless of 
whether the diversion resulted from confusion or harmed consumer interests in any way.”); Eric 
Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507, 559 (2005) 
(“[T]he doctrine exemplifies the devolution of trademark law. [Initial interest confusion] lacks a 
rigorous definition, a clear policy justification, and a uniform standard for analyzing claims. With its 
doctrinal flexibility, [initial interest confusion] has become the tool of choice for plaintiffs to shut 
down junior users who have not actually engaged in misappropriative uses [of a relevant mark].”). 
 12. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000). The anticybersquatting provisions of the Lanham Act were 
introduced in 1999, and they prohibit the practice of registering or using domain names that 
correspond with trademarks with a bad-faith intent to profit by selling the domain name to the 
corresponding trademark holder or to a third party. 
 13. Lemley, supra note 6, at 1687–88 (“Courts protect trademark owners against uses that would 
not have been infringements even a few years ago and protect as trademarks things that would not 
have received such protection in the past. And they are well on their way to divorcing trademarks 
entirely from the goods they are supposed to represent. Unfortunately, the changes in trademark 
doctrine over the last fifty years are not supported by the new economic learning. Rather, these 
changes have loosed trademark law from its traditional economic moorings and have offered little of 
substance to replace them.”). 
 14. Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging 
Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 166 (1982) (“The first 
amendment . . . does not operate to restrict the rights afforded trademark owners under traditional 
doctrine. Trademark law, however, has sometimes ventured beyond the confines of the [consumer] 
confusion model. Those seeking to extend the scope of trademark protection have championed models 
more closely allied with property than with tort. When consumer confusion ceases to be the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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unauthorized uses that relate to things other than consumer confusion and 
may, in fact, involve commentary, criticism, artistic expression, and the 
like, the First Amendment can and should come into play. Trademark law 
and the First Amendment increasingly collided prior to the rise of the 
Internet. Obvious examples are: the infamous “Enjoy Cocaine” poster15 
and the “Cocaine is the Real Thing” t-shirts,16 parodying the well-known 
Coca Cola trademark; the use of L.L. Bean’s registered trademark in a 
sexually explicit parody in High Society magazine;17 and the use of the 
famous Olympic-rings mark in a poster protesting state plans to convert 
the Olympic Village in Lake Placid into a prison after the winter games.18 
The Internet and the domain name system in particular add a number of 
new wrinkles to this already confusing balancing act. This is because the 
Internet is probably the most widespread form of communication invented 
so far. The extent of the Internet means that many commercial trademark 
holders can reach a larger potential market than ever before. It also means 
that people can express themselves generally, whether the content be about 
trademark holders or otherwise, to a wider audience than ever before. 
Thus, the scope and scale of potential clashes between trademark interests 
and the First Amendment is greater than ever before. Additionally, 
Internet communications generally take place on a global scale, so 
international harmonization of relevant rules and principles is implicated 
here in a manner that has not been paralleled in the past. Moreover, the 
domain name system arguably raises a scarcity problem in terms of both 
commercial trademark use and free speech that does not arise under real-
world paradigms because only one person can register a particular domain 
name at any given time as the online address for her message, at least as 
the system is currently constructed.  
These factors suggest that it is now time to reconsider how we balance 
trademark interests with free speech values in the domain space. This 
article aims to highlight areas that require urgent regulatory attention in 
the interests of preserving free speech in this context. Part I surveys the 
ways in which courts have approached the problem of balancing trademark 
interests with free speech rights in pre-Internet cases. This Part illustrates 
the legal context in which domain name disputes have subsequently arisen, 
 
 
touchstone, however, the accommodation between trademark law and the first amendment becomes 
more problematic.”). 
 15. Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D. N.Y. 1972). 
 16. Id. at 1189 n.5 (referring to a consumer complaint about the t-shirts that was not litigated in 
the case and did not involve the defendant in this case). 
 17. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 18. Stop the Olympic Prison v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 489 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss6/1
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and the fact that the domain name issues are indeed a continuation of 
preexisting concerns within trademark law and policy about the protection 
of free speech. Part II examines how courts and legislatures have dealt 
with the balance between trademark interests and free speech in the 
context of domain name disputes involving gripe sites and parody sites. 
Part III identifies and compares different legal and regulatory approaches 
to balancing trademark and free speech interests in domain names. The 
issues identified in this Part include: (a) clarifying and streamlining the 
common-law tests for trademark infringement and ACPA infringement in 
the online context; (b) creating special new domain name spaces for 
parody, commentary, and criticism, such as a new .sucks, .parody, .fun, or 
.crit gTLD;19 and (c) creating a specific judicial or legislative presumption 
that utilizing a pejorative word like sucks, parody, or critical at the end of 
a .com, .net, or .org domain name featuring a trademark will be prima 
facie evidence of a non-infringing use of the mark.20 These suggestions are 
not mutually exclusive and could all be developed simultaneously by 
relevant entities, including courts, legislatures, and private bodies such as 
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).21 
Part IV sets out conclusions and suggestions for future legal and 
regulatory developments in this area. 
I. TRADEMARKS AND FREE SPEECH IN THE “REAL WORLD” 
A. Trademark-Related Actions: Basic Principles 
Theoretically, there should be no conflict between trademark law and 
free speech because the fundamental purpose of trademark law is to 
prevent consumer confusion with respect to the source of products and 
services.22 The unauthorized use of trademarks outside the unfair 
 
 
 19. gTLD refers to generic Top Level Domain, such as .com, .org or .net, as opposed to a ccTLD 
or country code Top Level Domain, such as .uk for the United Kingdom, .ca for Canada, or .au for 
Australia.  
 20. It may be possible to argue that such a presumption already exists. See discussion in Part III 
infra. 
 21. ICANN is the body that administers the domain name system. For information on ICANN’s 
role in domain name administration, see http://www.icann.org/ (last visited July 13, 2006). 
 22. Denicola, supra note 14, at 165 (“Reliance on the confusion rationale as the primary basis of 
[trademark infringement] liability has effectively insulated trademark doctrine from constitutional 
attack. The necessity of establishing that the challenged use generates a likelihood of confusion 
restricts judicial intervention to instances in which the mark is used to misrepresent the source or 
sponsorship of goods or services. The regulation of such deceptive or misleading commercial speech 
presents no constitutional difficulties . . . .”); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 6, at 786 (“Most people 
think of trademark law in terms of what it forbids: the use of another party’s trademark, or something 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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competition arena should not technically raise the possibility of a 
trademark infringement action either because such uses are not in 
commerce,23 or because they should not cause consumer confusion.24 
However, as trademark law has developed in recent decades, the rights of 
trademark owners have become more expansive at the potential expense of 
free expression.25 Thus, pre-Internet trademark law has increasingly 
struggled to balance rights to free speech against commercial trademark 
interests.26 
To understand the various ways in which free speech has played into 
traditional trademark analysis, it is necessary to appreciate the two main 
kinds of trademark-based actions: traditional trademark infringement 
involving a likelihood of consumer confusion analysis,27 and dilution, 
involving blurring or tarnishment of a famous mark.28  
Traditional trademark infringement law has generally been premised on 
two interconnected aims: (a) to protect the public when purchasing a 
product or service to ensure that the purchasers get what they think they 
are paying for in terms of goods or services from a particular source; and 
(b) to ensure that those who invest in developing goodwill in a particular 
mark are protected against unfair misappropriations of that goodwill.29 
The Lanham Act contains two different provisions relating to traditional 
trademark infringement—15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) deals with infringement of 
registered trademark rights and 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) deals with 
 
 
resembling it, in a way that will cause confusion among consumers in the marketplace. Courts 
commonly describe the goal of trademark law as avoiding consumer confusion, which has the 
corollary effect of preventing the appropriation of a producer’s goodwill.”). 
 23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a), 1125(a)(1) (2000). 
 24. Id.; Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 441 F. Supp. 1220, 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) 
(“The touchstone of trademark infringement under the Lanham Act . . . is ‘likelihood of confusion’: 
whether a substantial number of ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely to be misled or confused as to 
the source of the different products.”); 2 GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 5.01[1] 
(2006) (“The issue of whether the use of the same trademark or two similar marks by different parties 
is likely to cause confusion among the purchasing public is central to most trademark cases.”). 
 25. Denicola, supra note 14, at 166; Lemley, supra note 6, at 1710–11 (“As trademarks are 
transformed from rights against unfair competition to rights to control language, our ability to discuss, 
portray, comment, criticize, and make fun of companies and their products is diminishing.”).  
 26. Denicola, supra note 14, at 159; Lemley, supra note 6, at 1710–13. 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2000) (infringement of registered trademark rights); 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(a)(1) (2000) (infringement of unregistered trademark rights). 
 28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (2000). 
 29. GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 16–17 
(2004) (citing S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946)); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 6, at 
786 (noting the benefits to both consumers and producers of consumers having access to “truthful 
information about the source of products and services”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss6/1
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unregistered rights. Each is premised on the idea of an unauthorized use in 
commerce of a mark in a manner that is likely to cause confusion.  
Over time, different courts have developed varying iterations of a 
likelihood-of-confusion test as part of the inquiry into whether a trademark 
has been infringed in a given case. As Professors Dinwoodie and Janis 
point out, the tests developed in different circuits for likelihood of 
confusion fit the same general pattern.30 They all include factors such as: 
(a) the alleged infringer’s intent; (b) actual confusion; and (c) a variety of 
factors that can be referred to as market factors,31 such as the relationship 
between the goods and services in question and the relationship between 
respective trade channels.32 
The trademark dilution action, on the other hand, does not contain such 
a test. Dilution is an expansive notion because it recognizes damage to a 
trademark holder irrespective of consumer confusion.33 Commentators 
have noted that such a cause of action potentially erodes the foundations 
of traditional trademark law, which is premised on protecting consumers 
from confusion as to the source of particular products or services.34 In fact, 
the definition of dilution in the Lanham Act specifically provides that a 
likelihood of consumer confusion is not necessary for a dilution action.35 
Dilution is defined as “the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to 
identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or 
absence of—(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and 
other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.”36 A 
dilution action is restricted in application to a famous mark.37 The original 
intention was to restrict the dilution action to a “relatively small class of 
nationally known trademarks whose fame is sufficiently great that the risk 
of blurring by multiple noncompeting uses is significant.”38 However, as 
 
 
 30. DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 29, at 469. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. at 470–71. 
 33. Id. at 563–66.  
 34. Lemley, supra note 6, at 1698–99 (“The most obvious example of doctrinal creep in 
trademark law is dilution. Dilution laws are directed against the possibility that the unique nature of a 
mark will be destroyed by companies who trade on the renown of the mark by selling unrelated goods, 
such as Kodak pianos or Buick aspirin. But because consumers need not be confused for dilution to 
occur, dilution laws represent a fundamental shift in the nature of trademark protection.”). See also 
Dogan & Lemley, supra note 6, at 777 (making similar observations in the context of applying 
trademark law to activities on the Internet conducted by search engines and other Internet 
intermediaries). 
 35. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). 
 36. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
 37. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000). 
 38. Lemley, supra note 6, at 1698. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Professor Lemley has noted, the action has taken on a greater life than this 
in practice, and courts have been prepared to extend protection to local 
marks even if somewhat obscure,39 and to noncompeting, nonidentical 
marks.40 He also notes that some courts have been prepared to find 
dilution without engaging in a fame inquiry with respect to the mark.41 
B. Factoring Free Speech into Trademark Infringement 
1. Free Speech and Traditional Trademark Infringement 
Courts have dealt with First Amendment concerns differently in the 
traditional trademark infringement context, as opposed to the trademark 
dilution context. In the context of traditional trademark infringement, there 
appear to be three different approaches to balancing rights to free 
expression against the proprietary interests of the trademark holder.42 
These approaches vary from case to case and, to some extent, from circuit 
to circuit. They have largely developed in cases involving parodies of a 
trademark. The approaches are: (a) adding a parody factor to the 
traditional common-law multifactor likelihood-of-confusion test;43 (b) 
requiring a stricter showing of all of the likelihood-of-confusion factors 
when the use of the mark is part of a political, social, or artistic message;44 
and (c) applying the traditional test for trademark infringement and then 
conducting a separate balancing of free speech rights with the trademark 
holder’s rights.45 It is also possible to argue that there is a distinct parody 
defense to trademark infringement. However, it is currently unclear 
whether that is the case.46 According to Professors Dinwoodie and Janis, it 
is more likely that what is often described as a parody defense is really a 
conclusion about a lack of likelihood of confusion in a given case.47  
Outside the above traditional approaches, free speech is also arguably 
accommodated to some extent by the fair use defense to trademark 
 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 1699. 
 41. Id. at 1698–99. 
 42. GILSON, supra note 24, at § 5.05[10][b]. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at § 5.05[10][a] (“Is parody a sufficient excuse, or even an affirmative defense to a charge 
of trademark infringement? The better view is that parody is not an affirmative defense in a trademark 
case, but that the humorous intent and any free speech rights of the parodists must be factored into the 
court’s analysis.”). 
 47. See DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 29, at 750. 
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infringement,48 particularly in the form of the nominative use subcategory 
of the defense recognized by some courts.49 The Lanham Act permits 
unauthorized use of another’s mark as a fair use when the mark is used 
only in a descriptive sense and in good faith.50 The nominative use test 
contains three elements:  
First, the product or service in question must be one not readily 
identifiable without use of the trademark; second, only so much of 
the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to 
identify the product or service; and third, the user must do nothing 
that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or 
endorsement by the trademark holder.51  
Obviously, fair use and nominative use protect certain informational uses 
of a trademark, largely in connection with the sale of other goods or 
services in good faith. It therefore has limited relevance to the focus of this 
Article—use of trademarks in domain names that identify gripe sites and 
parody sites on the Internet. These situations generally do not revolve 
around good-faith sales of goods or services, at least in the traditional 
trademark sense.52 However, there may be some useful parallels here in 
the sense that, in both contexts, a trademark is being used in an 
informational or descriptive sense and not in a competing commercial 
sense.  
2. Free Speech and Trademark Dilution 
In the context of a trademark dilution action, courts have approached 
the protection of free speech in a different way than the approach taken in 
traditional trademark infringement actions. Obviously, the approach of 
linking the protection of free speech to the likelihood-of-confusion factors 
has no application in the trademark dilution context because a trademark 
 
 
 48. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000). 
 49. 3 GILSON, supra note 24, at § 11.08[3][d] (“Some courts recognize a judge-made variation on 
the statutory fair use doctrine, calling it ‘nominative fair use’ and allowing the use of another’s 
trademark under certain limited circumstances. In these cases, a defendant uses a trademark that refers 
to another party’s product, such as a television station using the mark BOSTON MARATHON in 
connection with its broadcast of the marathon.”). 
 50. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000) (“[T]he use of the name, term, or device charged to be an 
infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark, of the party’s individual name in his own business, or 
of the individual name of anyone in privity with such party, or of a term or device which is descriptive 
of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of such party, or their 
geographic origin . . . .”). 
 51. New Kids On The Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 52. See infra Part II for a discussion of relevant case law examples. 
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dilution action does not require consumer confusion. Even if the 
defendant’s speech is effectively protected against the traditional 
infringement action in one of the ways described above, it may be 
enjoined under a dilution action.  
The two ways in which free speech interests may be protected under a 
trademark dilution action are somewhat indirect. The unauthorized use 
may be preserved if the mark is not sufficiently famous to sustain a 
dilution action,53 or if the unauthorized use is found to be noncommercial 
in nature.54 There is no specific exception, defense, or balancing test with 
respect to a dilution action that would protect First Amendment values 
more directly than this.  
Although the dilution statute requires a mark to be famous for a 
dilution action to succeed, courts have been willing to find this 
requirement to be satisfied fairly easily.55 Additionally, one might argue 
that for a mark to become the subject of criticism or parody, it presumably 
must have the requisite degree of fame attached to it.56  
The dilution statute also has an exception for noncommercial uses that 
may be of some comfort to those engaging in criticism or commentary.57 
Certainly, in the Internet context, it would seem to be at least arguable that 
a pure gripe site or parody site, without more, is not a commercial use for 
trademark purposes. However, this question may not be as clear-cut as it 
first appears. Courts have taken varying approaches to the question of 
whether a gripe site or parody site is commercial for dilution purposes.58 
Additionally, the dilution analysis in the Internet context may be 
decreasingly relevant if the ACPA is used more frequently and/or more 
successfully in these contexts to prevent unauthorized use of a domain 
name corresponding with a famous trademark. 
 
 
 53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (2000). 
 54. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B) (2000); GILSON, supra note 24, at § 5A.01[9][b]. 
 55. Lemley, supra note 6, at 1698–99. 
 56. GILSON, supra note 24, at § 5.05[10][a] (“[A]lthough the dilution statute requires that a mark 
be famous and distinctive, this should not be a barrier to owners of a trademark renowned enough to be 
parodied.”). 
 57. Id. 
 58. For example, in People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d 
915, 920 (E.D. Va. 2000), aff’d 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001), the District Court for the Eastern District 
of Virginia held that the defendant’s parody site utilizing the plaintiff’s PETA mark in its domain 
name (peta.org) satisfied the commercial use requirement of dilution law because the Website included 
links to commercial enterprises engaged in conduct that was contrary to the plaintiff’s animal 
protection efforts. In contrast, in TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433, 436 (5th Cir. 2004), the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a gripe site utilizing the plaintiff’s trademark in its domain name 
was not a commercial use of the mark and did not fall within the ambit of antidilution law. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss6/1
p 1327 Lipton book pages.doc10/2/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] GRIPE SITES, PARODY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1339 
 
 
 
 
3. Book, Movie, and Song Titles: A Special Case? 
There is one particular situation from traditional trademark law that 
deserves special mention in a discussion about expressive uses of Internet 
domain names. This is the case of book, movie, and song titles. Courts 
have developed some nuanced approaches to preserving free speech 
against trademark infringement claims in situations involving the use of 
trademarks in such titles; for example, the “Barbie Girl” song59 or the 
Ginger and Fred movie.60 There has been a trend for courts not to enjoin 
unauthorized use of trademarks in these contexts, provided that consumers 
are not misled by the use as to any affiliation or sponsorship by the mark 
holder61 and that the title is relevant to the work in question.62  
The special treatment of titles may be particularly pertinent in framing 
a policy for domain names because of the similarities in function between 
domain names and song, book, or movie titles. Each serves both a 
descriptive and an identifying function in relation to an underlying work. 
In the case of song, book, and movie titles, the title can describe the 
underlying work in the sense that it gives some idea of what the title’s 
audience may expect the work to be about; for example, the “Barbie Girl” 
song is most likely some kind of commentary on the Barbie Girl doll 
and/or ideas she connotes within contemporary society.63 A title can also 
identify a work for future reference; for example, if you have heard the 
“Barbie Girl” song on the radio and you think that one of your friends 
might like to listen to it, you will most likely use the song title to identify 
the song to your friend.  
 
 
 59. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002). In this case, Mattel failed to 
obtain an injunction against the producers of a popular song entitled “Barbie Girl” and relating to the 
“Barbie Girl” image in society. 
 60. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). In this case, the movie star Ginger Rogers 
failed to obtain an injunction against the use of the Ginger and Fred movie title in the context of a film 
about two Italian cabaret performers who made a living imitating Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire. 
 61. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902 (“A title is designed to catch the eye and to promote the value of the 
underlying work. Consumers expect a title to communicate a message about the book or movie, but 
they do not expect it to identify the publisher or producer.”); Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1001 (noting that at 
most some members of the public might draw an incorrect inference that Ginger Rogers was somehow 
involved with a film entitled Ginger and Fred, but that risk is so outweighed by interests in artistic 
expression as to preclude trademark infringement).  
 62. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 901 (“We expect a title to describe the underlying work, not to identify 
the producer, and Barbie Girl [the song] does just that.”); Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1001 (noting that the 
film title Ginger and Fred is “entirely truthful as to its content in referring to the film’s fictional 
protagonists who are known to their Italian audience as ‘Ginger and Fred’”). 
 63. As noted by Judge Kozinski in the Mattel case, “The song pokes fun at Barbie and the values 
that Aqua [the pop band] contends she represents.” Mattel, 296 F.3d at 901. 
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Domain names can also serve both of these functions, particularly in 
the context of a gripe site, parody site, or other kind of commentary site 
(for example, a fan site). A domain name can describe an underlying 
website in the sense of giving some idea of what the user might expect to 
find on the site; for example, a user might expect nikesucks.com to resolve 
to a Website critical of the Nike corporation.64 Even a domain name 
without a pejorative term attached to it like “sucks” or “stinks” could 
possibly be expected to resolve to any Website about a relevant trademark 
holder, as opposed to a website actually owned and operated by the 
trademark holder.  
A domain name can also identify a relevant website in the same sense 
that a book, song, or movie title can identify an underlying work. This 
aspect of domain name practice is unlikely to change even as search 
engines become more sophisticated. If I have found a particularly 
interesting Website relating either to commerce or to commentary and I 
want to discuss it with someone else, I am likely to mention the domain 
name of the site in the course of the discussion. This will particularly be 
the case if I want to refer someone else to the site. If I can identify the site 
as nikesucks.com, this is a much better way of directing someone else to 
the site than simply describing the site contents and hoping that the other 
person can retrace my search steps and find the same site. 
Courts have often protected book, song, and movie titles against 
trademark infringement actions because of consumers’ expectations about 
the function of a title in identifying and describing a relevant underlying 
work. It may be possible to draw some lessons from this practice in 
developing a framework for balancing free speech interests against 
commercial trademark interests in domain names. The deference that 
courts have given to book, song, and movie titles should not, of course, be 
overstated. There is no clear test for the protection of these titles that could 
create certainty as to whether a particular title does or does not infringe a 
protected trademark. As with other kinds of trademark cases, courts have 
developed a series of guidelines to help address the issue of trademark 
infringements in song, book, and movie titles. One example is that courts 
arguably have been less likely to find trademark infringement in the case 
of a mark utilized in a title where the use parodies the owner of the mark, 
rather than a different topic.65 Thus, the “Barbie Girl” song title is 
 
 
 64. In fact, as the date of writing, this domain name appears to be unregistered. 
 65. GILSON, supra note 24, at § 5.05[10][b]. 
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protected because the underlying song makes fun of ideas related to the 
“Barbie” image in society.66  
On the other hand, the use of marks relating to Dr. Seuss books, 
including the title The Cat in the Hat, was found to be infringing in a case 
where the use of the marks had no bearing on the trademark holder and 
were, in fact, a commentary on the O.J. Simpson trial.67 In Dr. Seuss 
Enterprises v. Penguin Books, the distinction between making fun of an 
intellectual property holder with an unauthorized use and making fun of 
something else trading on the plaintiff’s property was drawn with respect 
to both copyrights and trademarks held by the plaintiffs.68 In the context of 
trademark infringement, the court tied its reasoning back to the idea of the 
likelihood of consumer confusion. “[T]he cry of ‘parody!’ does not 
magically fend off otherwise legitimate claims of trademark infringement 
or dilution. There are confusing parodies and non-confusing parodies. All 
they have in common is an attempt at humor through the use of someone 
else’s trademark. A non-infringing parody is merely amusing, not 
confusing.”69 
Perhaps what this tells us for a discussion of developing a framework 
for protecting free speech in certain domain name uses is that the title 
cases are predominantly really about consumer confusion. Thus, like the 
question as to whether there is a parody defense to trademark 
infringement, the question of infringing song, movie, and book titles really 
boils down to the fundamental trademark inquiry as to whether consumers 
would likely be confused by the particular use. There may be a developing 
judicial presumption against consumer confusion in title cases, and this 
may usefully be translated to the domain name context in similar cases. 
These cases may include those where the use of a particular domain name 
is unlikely to cause confusion because it serves mainly an identifying and 
descriptive function in relation to the underlying Web page and does not 
confuse consumers as to the source of particular goods or services. 
This would still leave the question as to a trademark dilution action 
where consumer confusion is not the touchstone of the cause of action.70 
 
 
 66. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 901. 
 67. Dr. Seuss Enter. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (involving both 
copyright and trademark infringements of copyrights and marks held by the plaintiff). 
 68. Id. at 1400–01 (with respect to copyright infringement), 1405–06 (with respect to trademark 
infringement). 
 69. Id. at 1405. 
 70. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 905 (“Dilution . . . does not require a showing of consumer confusion . . . 
and dilution injunctions therefore lack the built-in First Amendment compass of trademark 
injunctions.”). 
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In Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records,71 a claim for trademark dilution against 
the distributors of the “Barbie Girl” song failed on the basis that the 
reference to the Barbie doll in the song and its title fell within the 
noncommercial use exception to a dilution action.72 The court considered 
the legislative history of the dilution statute in identifying a congressional 
intention that the noncommercial use exception was included in the statute 
to ensure the preservation of First Amendment interests with respect to 
noncommercial expression.73 Although the speech in the “Barbie Girl” 
song and song title was clearly commercial to some extent in that it was 
part of a commercially released sound recording, the court held that it was 
not purely commercial and so could fall within the noncommercial use 
exemption to trademark dilution.74  
In so holding, Judge Kozinski noted  
[a]lthough the boundary between commercial and noncommercial 
speech has yet to be clearly delineated, the “core notion of 
commercial speech” is that it “does no more than propose a 
commercial transaction” . . . . If speech is not “purely 
commercial”—that is, if it does more than propose a commercial 
transaction—then it is entitled to full First Amendment protection.75  
He proceeded to hold that the “Barbie Girl” song is not purely commercial 
speech because it also “lampoons the Barbie image and comments 
humorously on the cultural values Aqua [the pop band] claims she 
represents.”76 
Whether or not this is precisely what Congress intended in its 
definition of noncommercial speech, it seems intuitively to be a good line 
to draw for the purposes of this discussion. If we can recognize a judicial 
presumption, or at least a judicial leaning, against trademark dilution in 
cases where the unauthorized use of a mark is for purposes of identifying 
and describing an underlying work that does not compete commercially 
with the mark holder’s products or services, this may be very useful in the 
domain name context. Where a domain name is used to identify the 
 
 
 71. Id. at 894. 
 72. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B) (2000). 
 73. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 905–07. See also GILSON, supra note 24, at § 5A.01[9][b] (“The most 
important exception to Dilution Act liability is for the ‘[n]oncommercial use of a mark.’ This 
exception makes clear that the Act is intended to prevent the courts from enjoining speech that has 
been recognized to be constitutionally protected.”). 
 74. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 906. 
 75. Id. (quoting Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983))). 
 76. Id. at 907. 
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contents of a site that is a parody or criticism of a mark holder, the same 
reasoning should ring true. This is because domain names, like movie and 
song titles, clearly can, and often do, serve an identifying and descriptive 
function with respect to the associated Website. 
The question is whether it is necessary to perform a detailed likelihood-
of-confusion and dilution analysis in such cases, or whether we can begin 
to acknowledge an ex ante presumption that such uses are noncommercial 
(for dilution purposes) and will not confuse consumers (for trademark 
infringement purposes). This may create a better balance between 
trademark law and free speech interests, and the presumption may cut 
against a discernable judicial trend to extend trademark rights in a way that 
might chill expression on the Internet. However, before proposing such an 
approach as a solution to a perceived problem, it is necessary to identify 
ways in which courts have been approaching this problem in the domain 
name context to date, along with the impact of more recent trademark 
legislation such as the ACPA on these disputes. 
II. TRADEMARKS AND FREE SPEECH IN THE DOMAIN SPACE 
A. Free Speech Under the ACPA 
Trademark holders who are concerned about unauthorized uses of 
domain names corresponding with their marks have a number of options 
available. They can obviously utilize traditional trademark law and may, in 
some cases, be able to use trademark dilution law.77 Additionally, the late 
1990s brought new avenues for trademark holders in the form of the 
ACPA and the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy 
(“UDRP”).78 Both were directed at the practice known as 
cybersquatting—that is, registering domain names that match well-known 
trademarks with the intent of profiting from transfers of the names to the 
rightful owners.79 This practice had become prevalent in the early days of 
the World Wide Web when many corporations with well-known marks did 
not recognize the full potential of registering domain names corresponding 
with their marks. One of the most famous cybersquatters was Dennis 
Toeppen, who registered over one hundred domain names corresponding 
with well-known marks with the intention of selling the names to the 
 
 
 77. See supra Parts I.B.1 & 2. 
 78. A full text of the policy is available at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (last 
visited July 13, 2006). 
 79. DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 29, at 623. 
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rightful owners for profit.80 Traditional cybersquatters were generally 
regarded as acting in bad faith in a moral, and ultimately also a legal, sense 
as there was arguably no useful social outcome for their activities.81 
Initially, aggrieved mark holders either negotiated with cybersquatters 
for transfer of the relevant domain names, and/or resorted to litigation 
under existing trademark principles—actions for basic trademark 
infringement and dilution. Courts were sympathetic for the most part, 
finding trademark infringements and dilutions to be made out even in 
cases where there was no obvious consumer confusion (for infringement 
purposes) and no obvious commercial use.82 In Panavision International v. 
Toeppen,83 for example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was prepared 
to find the in-commerce requirement satisfied for dilution purposes on the 
basis that the defendant cybersquatter’s business was registering domain 
names corresponding with well-known trademarks and selling them to 
rightful trademark owners.84 In Planned Parenthood v. Bucci,85 the court 
identified two ways in which the in-commerce requirement for trademark 
infringement and dilution was satisfied: (a) defendant cybersquatter’s 
actions affected the plaintiff’s ability to offer its services over the 
Internet;86 and (b) Internet users constitute a national, if not international, 
audience who must use interstate telephone lines to access the Internet, 
and the nature of the Internet itself satisfies the in-commerce 
requirement.87 The court in Planned Parenthood further held that there 
was a likelihood of consumer confusion on the facts because the defendant 
was offering informational services about abortion and birth control.88 
Finally, the court held that a disclaimer on the defendant’s Website 
 
 
 80. See Jacqueline D. Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting: Taking Domain Name Disputes Past 
Trademark Policy, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1361, 1369–71 (2005). 
 81. See id. at 1387–92 (describing the development of the idea that cybersquatting was an 
immoral commercial practice and extending traditional trademark actions to combat this practice based 
on notions of bad faith). 
 82. See, e.g., Panavision Int’l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding trademark 
dilution where the defendant had registered domain names corresponding with famous marks owned 
by the plaintiff and had put material unrelated to the plaintiff’s marks or business on the relevant 
website); Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding 
trademark infringement and dilution to be made out where defendant registered domain name 
corresponding with plaintiff’s trademark for purposes of a Website critical of plaintiff’s point of view). 
 83. 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 84. Panavision, 141 F.3d 1316, 1325 (“Toeppen’s ‘business’ is to register trademarks as domain 
names and then sell them to the rightful trademark owners . . . . This is a commercial use.”). 
 85. 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 86. Id. at 1434. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1437–38. 
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distinguishing itself from the plaintiff’s services would not cure the 
confusion.89  
Planned Parenthood was not actually a classic cybersquatting case 
because the defendant in question wanted to utilize the plaintiff’s 
trademark for a website that promulgated a point of view opposed to the 
plaintiff’s.90 In many ways, that case is more akin to the situations under 
consideration in this article—gripe sites and parodies. The defendant in 
Planned Parenthood was not seeking to extort money from the plaintiff 
for transfer of the name.91 He wanted to retain the name and use it himself 
to promulgate his own views.92 However, the case is a good example of 
how pre-ACPA courts handled these situations and how easy it seems to 
satisfy a court that trademark infringement or dilution is made out even in 
circumstances that do not involve what one might consider traditional 
infringing elements. 
Because of concerns about cybersquatting, Congress enacted the 
ACPA, which was largely constructed around Dennis Toeppen’s 
conduct.93 It creates a civil action against a person who traffics in or uses a 
domain name corresponding with a trademark with a bad-faith intent to 
profit from the mark.94 The Act sets out a nonexclusive list of factors that 
courts may consider when ascertaining whether relevant conduct is in bad 
faith.95 The factors include: 
(a) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the 
registrant in the domain name;96 
 
 
 89. Id. at 1441 (“Due to the nature of Internet use, defendant’s appropriation of plaintiff’s mark 
as a domain name and home page address cannot adequately be remedied by a disclaimer. Defendant’s 
domain name and home page address are external labels that, on their face, cause confusion among 
Internet users and may cause Internet users who seek plaintiff’s web site to expend time and energy 
accessing defendant’s web site . . . . [A] disclaimer on the defendant’s home page would not be 
sufficient to dispel the confusion induced by his home page address and domain name.”).  
 90. See Lipton, supra note 80, at 1393. 
 91. Id. 
 92. His conduct was perhaps more morally, and maybe legally, questionable than the situations 
under discussion here because he did additional things that might facilitate consumer confusion. For 
example, he displayed a banner that read, “Welcome to the PLANNED PARENTHOOD HOME 
PAGE!” prominently on his website. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1432. 
 93. This is evident from the drafting. See discussion in Part II.A infra. 
 94. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (2000) (creating civil liability for violators). 
 95. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i) (2000). 
 96. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I). 
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(b) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal name 
of the registrant or a name that is otherwise commonly used to 
identify that person;97 
(c) the registrant’s prior use of the domain name in connection with 
a bona fide offering of goods or services;98 
(d) the registrant’s bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark 
in a site accessible under the domain name;99 
(e) the registrant’s intent to divert customers from the mark owner’s 
online location in a manner likely to cause consumer confusion or 
trademark dilution;100 
(f) the registrant’s offer to transfer the domain name to the mark 
owner or a third party for financial gain without having used or 
intending to use the domain name for a bona fide offering of goods 
or services;101 
(g) the registrant’s provision of misleading false contact information 
when registering the domain name, the person’s failure to maintain 
accurate contact information, or the person’s prior conduct 
indicating a pattern of such conduct;102 
(h) the person’s registration or acquisition of multiple domain 
names which the person knows are identical or confusingly similar 
to marks of others, or dilutive of famous marks of others;103 and, 
(i) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the registrant’s 
domain name is distinctive for the purposes of the dilution 
provisions of the trademark legislation.104 
The Act provides that a bad-faith intent may not be found in a situation 
where the court determines that the registrant believed and had reasonable 
grounds to believe that the use of the domain name was a fair use or 
otherwise lawful.105 
 
 
 97. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(II). 
 98. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(III). 
 99. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IV). 
 100. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V). 
 101. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VI). 
 102. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VII). 
 103. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VIII). 
 104. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IX). 
 105. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii).  
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Although this legislation provides some clear rules against traditional 
Toeppen-style cybersquatting,106 it raises concerns as well. The most 
obvious is whether it was necessary at all given that courts apparently 
were not having too much trouble finding trademark infringement and 
dilution in such situations prior to the enactment of the ACPA.107 The 
second concern that is only emerging in more recent cases is that the 
ACPA is a tool that is, in fact, extremely narrowly tailored to Toeppen-
style cases, and its application in other kinds of domain name disputes, 
including complaints about gripe sites and parody sites, can be 
problematic. 
The notion of a bad-faith intent to profit, which is central to an ACPA 
claim, has caused some confusion in cases involving gripe sites and 
parody sites.108 Further, the bad faith factors have not been all that useful 
in cases that do not fit the Toeppen paradigm. For example, as with the 
opening hypothetical to this Article, a person may register multiple 
iterations of a domain name containing a business’s trademark for the 
purposes of criticizing or lampooning the business.109 Is this the kind of 
multiple registration that the ACPA contemplates as one of the bad-faith 
factors?110 It would seem that the ACPA’s notion of multiple registrations 
should relate to registering multiple domain names corresponding to 
 
 
 106. Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 313 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating that the paradigmatic harm 
that the ACPA was intended to combat is the practice of cybersquatters registering several hundred 
domain names in an effort to sell them to legitimate owners of the marks); Lucas Nursery & 
Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse, 359 F.3d 806, 810 (6th Cir. 2004) (same); TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 
F.3d 433, 439 (5th Cir. 2004) (same); Northland Ins. Co. v. Blaylock, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1123 (D. 
Minn. 2000) (“Congress passed the [ACPA] to protect ‘consumers and American businesses, to 
promote the growth of online commerce, and to provide clarity in the law for trademark owners by 
prohibiting the bad-faith and abusive registration of distinctive marks as Internet domain names with 
the intent to profit from the goodwill associated with such marks—a practice commonly referred to as 
“cybersquatting.”’” (quoting Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 495 (2d 
Cir. 2000))). 
 107. See Panavision Int’l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding trademark dilution 
where the defendant had registered domain names corresponding with famous marks owned by the 
plaintiff and had put material unrelated to the plaintiff’s marks or business on the relevant website); 
Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding trademark 
infringement and dilution where defendant registered domain name corresponding with plaintiff’s 
trademark for purposes of a Website critical of plaintiff’s point of view). 
 108. See discussion in Part II.A, infra. 
 109. See, e.g., Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2005) (defendant 
registered two domain names corresponding to plaintiff’s mark for the purposes of a gripe site); TMI, 
Inc. v Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2004) (defendant registered several domain names 
corresponding to plaintiff’s mark for the purposes of a gripe site); Toronto-Dominion Bank v. 
Karpachev, 188 F. Supp. 2d 110 (D. Mass. 2002) (defendant registered sixteen domain names 
corresponding to the plaintiff’s mark for the purposes of a gripe site). 
 110. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VIII) (2000). 
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multiple marks, rather than one mark if the legislation is aimed at conduct 
such as that engaged in by Toeppen. 
One might also query whether this factor should have been included in 
the legislation at all. Clearly, it was included to combat conduct such as 
Dennis Toeppen’s in the early days of the domain name system—
registering multiple domain names corresponding with trademarks with 
the intent to extort money from legitimate mark holders for transfer of the 
names to them.111 However, this factor may be unnecessarily confusing in 
subsequent practice. Is it really relevant to a cybersquatting claim that the 
defendant has registered multiple domain names, even if they correspond 
to multiple well-known trademarks? What does this factor really tell the 
court in any given case?  
A traditional Toeppen-style cybersquatter who registers names with the 
sole intent to profit from their transfer to the rightful owner may well 
register: (a) multiple domain names corresponding with multiple marks; 
(b) multiple domain names corresponding with one mark; or, (c) one 
domain name corresponding with a mark. In the case of registering 
multiple domain names corresponding with multiple marks, the registrant 
may make legitimate use of some of the domain names, while holding the 
others hostage for profit from the rightful owners. She may, for example, 
run gripe sites or parody sites (assuming these are legitimate uses) from 
some of the domain names, while using others to extort money from 
relevant mark holders. She may, in fact, run gripe sites or parody sites 
from all of the domain names and let it be known that they are available 
for sale if a mark holder wants them. Alternatively, she may run gripe sites 
or parody sites from all of the domain names and say nothing about sale, 
hoping that people will simply make her an offer in due course.  
This latter practice is akin to people registering domain names 
corresponding with the personal names of famous people and setting up 
fan sites, which so far appears to be a legitimate use of the domain names 
for the most part.112 Some of these registrants may be prepared to transfer 
 
 
 111. See Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316. 
 112. UDRP arbitration panels have not generally ordered transfers of domain names to celebrities 
in such cases on the basis that these are a legitimate use of the names, provided that they do not cause 
confusion as to sponsorship or affiliation. See, e.g., Bruce Springsteen v. Jeff Burgar and Bruce 
Springsteen Club, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No. D2000-1532 (Jan. 2001) (holding 
by a majority of WIPO arbitration panel to decline to transfer domain name of an authorized fan site, 
brucespringsteen.com, to singer Bruce Springsteen because the site was found to be a legitimate use of 
the domain name and did not preclude the singer from utilizing brucespringsteen.net). There is also 
some question as to whether all celebrities have requisite trademark rights in their personal names to 
seek the protection of the UDRP. See Lipton, supra note 80, at 1416–19. Even the personal name 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss6/1
p 1327 Lipton book pages.doc10/2/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] GRIPE SITES, PARODY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1349 
 
 
 
 
the names to relevant celebrities for a fee and are using the fan sites as 
placemarks to satisfy the legitimate use requirements of the UDRP,113 
while others may legitimately want to maintain fan sites and not transfer 
them to relevant celebrities or their management.114 There is not 
necessarily any easy way to discern a bad-faith registrant from a legitimate 
registrant in these kinds of situations. 
Looking at other relevant-bad faith factors in the ACPA, what would 
constitute an offer to transfer the domain name to the mark owner or a 
third party for financial gain?115 Clearly the legislature had in mind 
schemes designed with the central aim of transferring names to rightful 
owners for profit.116 What about situations where a registrant is prepared 
to transfer the names, or might be prepared to transfer the names, to the 
rightful owner, but that was not the initial aim of the registration? Could 
the comment in the opening hypothetical that it would take a lot more than 
$500 to buy the domain name satisfy the bad-faith factor relating to an 
offer to transfer the domain name to the mark owner?  
Although judicial decisions have not focused so much on this issue, 
there has been some confusion about the application of the related bad-
faith intent to profit aspect of the ACPA.117 As Mr. Snow has pointed out, 
the statute attaches liability for a bad-faith intent even after the registrant 
has registered the relevant domain name.118 In other words, there is a 
temporal problem with the statute in that it does not require the bad faith 
intent to exist at the time of domain name registration.119 This, in turn, 
means that any subsequent attempt to sell the name for profit that could in 
some way be described as bad faith could run afoul of the ACPA. This 
might include an offer to sell the name to a complainant after a dispute has 
arisen, thus bolstering the complainant’s grounds for an ACPA claim.120 
 
 
provisions of the ACPA may not assist here if the bad-faith intent to profit from transfer of the name 
factor cannot be satisfied. See 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A) (2000); Lipton, supra note 80, at 1424. 
 113. See Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, cl. 4(c), available at http://www. 
icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm [hereinafter UDRP].  
 114. See, e.g., Springsteen, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No. D2000-1532. 
 115. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VI) (2000). 
 116. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A). 
 117. See discussion in Part II.A, infra. 
 118. Ned Snow, The Constitutional Failing of the Anticybersquatting Act, 41 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 1, 41 (2005). 
 119. Id. 
 120. See, e.g., People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d 
915, 920–21 (E.D. Va. 2000), aff’d 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding defendant had requisite bad-
faith intent to profit from transfer of a domain name corresponding with plaintiff’s mark even though 
his comment that the plaintiff could “make him an offer” for the name occurred after the litigation 
commenced). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 1327 Lipton book pages.doc10/2/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
1350 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:1327 
 
 
 
 
Most attempts to sell a domain name corresponding with a trademark 
to a rightful trademark owner could, in some way, be regarded as bad 
faith, at least from the mark holder’s point of view. Certainly, mark 
holders would argue that those operating gripe sites about them who then 
agree to transfer the names back to them for a fee, as is a possibility in the 
above hypothetical, satisfy the requisite bad-faith intent to profit criterion 
from the ACPA. This does not mean that the argument will always be 
successful, but it does mean that the narrow tailoring of the ACPA to 
combat Toeppen-style cybersquatting has significant potential for 
confusion in application to nontraditional cybersquatting cases.121  
Another problem with the bad-faith intent to profit requirement can 
arise when the defendant has set up a gripe site or parody site in such a 
way that the defendant, or someone connected to the defendant, receives a 
financial benefit from referring to or advertising products or services that 
may or may not be relevant to the plaintiff’s activities. If the products or 
services are relevant to the plaintiff’s activities, they may bolster the 
likelihood that the plaintiff will succeed on a traditional trademark 
infringement claim.122 If not, the possibility of an ACPA success still 
looms large.  
There is also currently some judicial confusion as to whether an ACPA 
claim requires a showing of a commercial use of the mark by the 
defendant. Some courts have interpreted the ACPA’s fourth bad faith 
factor123 as imposing a burden on the defendant to satisfy the court that she 
has not used the relevant mark in a commercial manner. At least one court 
has suggested that the commercial use requirement might be satisfied by 
the fact that the Website in question potentially deters customers from the 
plaintiff’s online location.124 However, not all courts have subscribed to 
 
 
 121. See, e.g., Northland Ins. Co. v. Blaylock, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1124 (D. Minn. 2000) 
(involving plaintiff who argued that an inference could be made that defendant’s intent in registering a 
domain name corresponding with its trademark for a gripe site complaining about plaintiff’s service 
was to use the domain name as leverage to extract money from plaintiff to help compensate defendant 
for his perceived losses from his dealings with plaintiff; the court noted that the argument has some 
merit, but the court could not conclude in preliminary proceedings that the plaintiff was likely to 
prevail on the argument because the record did not sufficiently reflect a bad-faith intent to profit). 
 122. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1430, 1433 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997) (suggesting that plaintiff and defendant were effectively competing in offering informational 
services on abortion and birth control). 
 123. The fourth factor relates to “the registrant’s bona fide non-commercial or fair use of the mark 
in a site accessible under the domain name.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IV) (2000). 
 124. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d 915, 920 
(E.D. Va. 2000), aff’d 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that the commercial use requirement 
appears to have been satisfied by the fact that the defendant’s Website linked to the Websites of 
organizations selling fur and animal products and potentially deterred the plaintiff’s customers from 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss6/1
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this approach. In Bosley Medical Institute v. Kremer,125 the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that the ACPA does not contain a commercial use 
requirement. The court was concerned that an approach that requires a 
commercial use and all too readily finds it in cases of commentary and 
parody sites could lead to a situation where most otherwise 
constitutionally protected consumer commentary would be placed under 
the restrictions of the Lanham Act.126 
Even courts that have recognized a commercial use requirement in the 
ACPA have split on the question whether the defendant’s use of the 
website to link to other websites where goods and services are available 
would satisfy the requirement. In People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals v. Doughney,127 the court accepted as relevant to the commercial 
use requirement the fact that the defendant’s Website linked to other sites 
where customers could purchase fur and animal products antithetical to the 
plaintiff’s views and messages.128 However, in similar circumstances, the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Lamparello v. Falwell129 held that the 
defendant’s linking of his commentary website to an Amazon.com 
Webpage selling a particular book would not support an ACPA claim 
because the link on his webpage “does not diminish the communicative 
function of his website.”130 The court also suggested that the commercial 
use requirement was not satisfied here because the defendant “did not even 
stand to gain financially from sales of the book at Amazon.com.”131 This 
sounds reasonable, but it also appears to directly contradict Doughney.132 
Further, is it different from the facts in the introductory hypothetical 
where someone posts a message on the Website suggesting that customers 
might prefer Selina’s Steakhouse to Selma’s Steakhouse? Selina’s 
Steakhouse may detract custom from Selma’s and arguably confuse 
consumers along the lines addressed in Doughney. Would this be a 
trademark infringement and/or an ACPA infringement even though the 
purpose of the Website is commentary and criticism? What about a 
 
 
finding the plaintiff’s website—these factors also satisfied the plaintiff’s traditional trademark 
infringement claim). 
 125. 403 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 126. Id. 
 127. 113 F. Supp. 2d 915. 
 128. Id. at 919–20. It is not clear to what extent this factor swayed the ACPA analysis as distinct 
from the trademark infringement analysis; however, it was clearly in the court’s mind as relevant to the 
plaintiff’s claims. 
 129. 420 F.3d 309, 320 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See infra for a more detailed comparison of the two cases on this point. 
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situation where you later decide to fund your Website design through 
advertising and thus gain revenues from the Website? Is this a commercial 
use for ACPA purposes, assuming such a requirement to exist? 
The drafting and interpretation of the above-mentioned provisions of 
the ACPA have implications for the protection of free speech in 
cyberspace and may necessitate some judicial or legislative clarification 
on the kinds of situations that will not run afoul of the legislation where 
free speech is implicated. Several courts have already recognized the 
potential for free speech to be chilled on the Internet in an overzealous 
application of the ACPA. In Northland Insurance v. Blaylock,133 for 
example, Judge Doty in the District Court of Minnesota noted:  
While the public interest clearly demands that the Internet be used 
responsibly and in conformance with intellectual property laws, the 
right of defendant to openly express his viewpoint should likewise 
not be curtailed absent clearer demonstration that the claims against 
him have merit. . . . Public policy requires that preliminary 
injunctions, especially those that stand to potentially chill a person’s 
right to free speech, no matter how disagreeable that speech may be, 
should only be granted in the most extraordinary of circumstances 
. . . .134 
However, courts have not given complete deference to the operators of 
gripe sites and parody sites whose Internet domain names correspond with 
well-known marks. Moreover, the cases in which courts have been 
prepared to enjoin uses of particular domain names in the parody or 
commentary context are often difficult to distinguish from the cases in 
which courts have not been prepared to grant relief.135 The distinctions 
that courts make often rely heavily on justifications relating to multiple 
domain name registrations by a defendant and post-registration intentions 
to sell domain names to rightful owners, both of which are problematic 
bad-faith criteria as noted above.  
In Falwell,136 for example, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was not 
prepared to enjoin the defendant’s use of a domain name comprising a 
misspelling of the plaintiff’s name (www.fallwell.com) for a website 
critical of the plaintiff’s views on homosexuality.137 The court 
 
 
 133. 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (D. Minn. 2000). 
 134. Id. at 1125. 
 135. See discussion in Part II.A, supra. 
 136. 420 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 137. Id. 
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distinguished two similar cases138 on the basis that the defendants in those 
cases had registered multiple domain names corresponding to marks held 
by various other people, and that, in one case, the defendant had made a 
comment in the course of the litigation that the plaintiff could “make him 
an offer” for transfer of the name.139 As noted above, it is difficult to see 
how the multiple registrations of other domain names have any bearing on 
the use of the domain name corresponding to the plaintiff’s mark where, in 
fact, the defendant is actually utilizing the name for some speech 
purpose—unlike the classic Toeppen-style situation where the defendant is 
not using the domain name to communicate anything in particular.140 
Clearly the registration of multiple domain names is contemplated as only 
one of the bad-faith factors in the ACPA, and courts can be swayed by the 
other factors despite multiple registrations of domain names.141 However, 
it seems that utilizing the bad-faith factors from the ACPA can lead to 
results that are counterintuitive when they are applied to situations that are 
not on all fours with classic Toeppen-style cybersquatting. 
B. Free Speech Under the UDRP 
The UDRP is the basis of a private dispute resolution system that is 
implemented under the domain name registration contract for generic top 
level domains (“gTLDs”) such as .com, .org, and .net. When a person 
registers such a domain name, she becomes contractually bound as part of 
the registration agreement to submit to a private arbitration if someone 
complains about registration of the relevant name.142 Like the ACPA, the 
UDRP’s main purpose is to protect trademark interests in domain names 
and to prevent bad-faith registrations and uses for non-legitimate 
purposes.143 It is a fast, inexpensive, online procedure that can result in a 
transfer of a domain name to a rightful owner.144 
 
 
 138. Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 382 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2004); People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals, Inc. v. Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d 915 (E.D. Va. 2000), aff’d 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001).  
 139. Falwell, 420 F.3d at 321. 
 140. In Toeppen, for example, Toeppen had registered two of Panavision’s marks and used one for 
a Website containing photographs of the town of Pana in Illinois. The other Website merely contained 
the word “hello.” Lipton, supra note 80, at 1388–89. 
 141. See list of bad faith factors in Part II.A, supra. 
 142. UDRP, supra note 113, at cl. 4. 
 143. See, e.g., id., at cl. 2 (“By applying to register a domain name, or by asking us to maintain or 
renew a domain name registration, you hereby represent and warrant to us that (a) the statements that 
you made in your Registration Agreement are complete and accurate; (b) to your knowledge, the 
registration of the domain name will not infringe upon or otherwise violate the rights of any third 
party; (c) you are not registering the domain name for an unlawful purpose; and (d) you will not 
knowingly use the domain name in violation of any applicable laws or regulations. It is your 
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To succeed in a UDRP arbitration, the complainant must prove that: (a) 
the domain name in question is confusingly similar to a trademark in 
which the complainant has rights;145 (b) the registrant has no legitimate 
interests in the domain name;146 and (c) the domain name has been 
registered and is being used in bad faith.147 The UDRP includes a list of 
factors that will suggest that a domain name has been registered and is 
being used in bad faith for these purposes. The UDRP’s bad-faith factors 
include circumstances indicating that: (a) the registrant intended to transfer 
the domain name to the complainant or to a third party for a profit;148 (b) 
the registrant transferred the name to prevent the owner of a trademark 
from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that 
the registrant has engaged in a pattern of such conduct;149 (c) the registrant 
registered the name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of 
a competitor;150 and (d) the registrant has used the name to attempt to 
attract Internet users to its own online location by creating confusion as to 
the sponsorship or affiliation of the registrant with the complainant’s 
mark.151 
As with the ACPA, the registrant has an opportunity to defend herself 
by establishing that she has a legitimate interest in the domain name in 
question. The UDRP sets out some factors that arbitrators may consider in 
deciding whether a use of a domain name by a registrant is legitimate for 
UDRP purposes. These factors include: (a) before any notification of the 
dispute, the registrant used, or made demonstrable preparations to use, the 
relevant domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or 
services;152 (b) the registrant has been commonly known by the relevant 
name;153 and (c) the registrant is making a legitimate noncommercial or 
fair use of the name without intent for commercial gain to mislead 
consumers or tarnish a trademark.154 
 
 
responsibility to determine whether your domain name registration infringes or violates someone 
else’s rights.”). 
 144. Id. at clause 4(i) (“The remedies available to a complainant pursuant to any proceeding 
before an Administrative Panel shall be limited to requiring the cancellation of your domain name or 
the transfer of your domain name registration to the complainant.”). 
 145. Id. at cl. 4(a)(i). 
 146. Id. at cl. 4(a)(ii). 
 147. Id. at cl. 4(a)(iii). 
 148. Id. at cl. 4(b)(i). 
 149. Id. at cl. 4(b)(ii). 
 150. Id. at cl. 4(b)(iii). 
 151. Id. at cl. 4(b)(iv). 
 152. Id. at cl. 4(c)(i). 
 153. Id. at cl. 4(c)(ii). 
 154. Id. at cl. 4(c)(iii). 
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The UDRP thus reflects the same policy aims as the ACPA, even 
though it achieves them slightly differently. Arguably, the First 
Amendment is not technically implicated by the UDRP in the same way as 
it might be by provisions of the Lanham Act, such as the ACPA, because 
it is not congressional action subject to First Amendment guarantees.155 In 
particular, a UDRP arbitration is not decisive of the parties’ respective 
rights in the sense that the dispute can still be litigated before a domestic 
court under national trademark law.156 However, just because the UDRP is 
not technically subject to the First Amendment does not mean that free 
speech is not implicated by the policy. In fact, because of the global reach 
of the policy, and the fact that domestic litigation may be too costly for 
some disputants, the UDRP could have a greater impact on free expression 
than domestic trademark law. 
A brief consideration of the key provisions of the UDRP evidences that 
it suffers from some of the same flaws as the ACPA in the sense that, on 
its face, it seems focused on the protection of trademark interests to the 
detriment of other important interests in domain names, such as free 
speech.157 However, the drafting of the UDRP is subtly different from the 
ACPA and may, as a result, strike a better balance than the ACPA. For 
example, whereas the ACPA does not create a temporal link between the 
development of a registrant’s bad faith motives and the actual time of 
registration of a domain name, the UDRP does contemplate such a link. In 
other words, the UDRP contemplates that a domain name should be 
transferred to the complainant where the domain name in question “has 
been registered and is being used in bad faith.”158 The UDRP’s list of bad-
faith factors is also generally drafted in terms of bad-faith registration of a 
name as opposed to an intent that developed at a later time—for example, 
after the commencement of litigation, as was the case in the Doughney 
litigation.  
 
 
 155. See Estée Lauder, Inc. v. Hanna, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Case No D2000-
0869 (Sept. 25, 2000). 
It may well be that Respondent is making a “fair use” of Complainant’s marks in their 
“consumer complaint” websites and that the contents of those sites are constitutionally 
protected in the United States. It is, however, neither necessary nor appropriate to make such 
an evaluation here. The issue to be determined under paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the [UDRP] is 
more restricted and specific. 
Id. ¶ 6B. 
 156. UDRP, supra note 113, at cl. 4(k); see also Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Karpachev, 188 F. 
Supp. 2d 110 (D. Mass. 2002) (domain name registrant was unsuccessful in a UDRP arbitration and 
brought civil claims against the arbitrator and the trademark holder in a domestic court). 
 157. See Lipton, supra note 80, at 1374–77.  
 158. UDRP, supra note 113, at cl. 4(a)(iii) (emphasis added). 
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The requirement that bad faith be shown at the time of registration 
avoids some of the problems that arise under the ACPA in situations such 
as the introductory hypothetical—where there was not necessarily a bad-
faith profit motive at the time of registration, but, later on (after a dispute 
arises), the registrant considers making a profit from sale of the name to 
the rightful owner. In these situations under the ACPA, the registrant is in 
a no-win situation because, even if she registered the domain name 
without an intent to profit in bad faith, any subsequent attempt to sell the 
name to the rightful owner, say, to avoid protracted litigation, may appear 
to create the requisite bad-faith motive and bolster the complainant’s case. 
Under the UDRP, at least, the complainant has to establish that the domain 
name in question was actually registered in bad faith and has been used in 
bad faith.159 
This still leaves the question open as to whether the registration and use 
of a domain name for purposes of a gripe site or parody would satisfy the 
UDRP criteria. However, it is at least arguable that clause 4(c)(iii) of the 
UDRP160 would exempt some of these situations in its suggestion that 
legitimate noncommercial or fair uses will not satisfy the bad faith test.161 
This clause certainly gives room to UDRP arbitrators to protect free 
speech in the form of criticism, commentary, or parody, provided that 
there is no concurrent consumer confusion or tarnishment of a relevant 
mark.162 
The problem is, as with judicial interpretations of the ACPA, there is 
no clear test as to when a commentary site is a fair or legitimate use. A 
comparison of two early UDRP decisions involving consumer 
commentary and gripe sites demonstrates the confusion that can arise 
under the UDRP in this respect. These decisions also show that, regardless 
of how the UDRP is drafted, UDRP arbitrators are likely to be influenced, 
at least to some extent, by domestic trademark laws.163 Thus, judicial 
 
 
 159. Id. 
 160. Clause 4(c)(iii) cites the following circumstance as potentially demonstrating a legitimate 
interest in a domain name: “[The registrant is] making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the 
domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the 
trademark or service mark at issue.” UDRP, supra note 113, at 4(c)(iii). 
 161. This should also be the case under the ACPA, but this has not always been apparent in 
practice as evidenced by the above discussion of relevant ACPA cases.  
 162. UDRP, supra note 113, at cl. 4(c)(iii). 
 163. See, e.g., Bridgestone Firestone, Inc. v. Myers, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, 
Case No. D2000-0190 ¶ 6 (July 6, 2000) (“The discussion and decision herein will . . . be governed by 
the terms of the [UDRP], although reference by analogy may be made to principles of U.S. law, as two 
of the Complainants are U.S. corporations, Respondent is a U.S. resident, and both parties have cited 
U.S. law in their submissions.”). 
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interpretations of the ACPA may well be decisive in applying provisions 
of the UDRP even though the UDRP does not have as many, or as 
intricate, bad-faith factors as the ACPA.164 
In Estée Lauder, Inc. v. Hanna,165 a UDRP arbitration panel ordered a 
domain name registrant who had registered deliberate misspellings of the 
complainant’s mark as domain names (estelauder.com and estelauder.net) 
to transfer the names to the complainant.166 The respondent’s motive 
appeared to have been profit as he represented a firm of personal injury 
lawyers who represented litigants against large corporations.167 The 
Websites in question contained comment forms for visitors to complain 
about Estée Lauder to the Better Business Bureau and/or to the site 
operator, although the site operator was not identified.168 The registrant 
had apparently engaged in similar conduct with respect to other well-
known trademarks.169 The complainant alleged that the registrant was a 
cybersquatter and was creating confusion as to the affiliation or 
sponsorship of the relevant sites.170 The registrant responded that its use 
was noncommercial and that it included clear disclaimers on its websites 
for the purpose of avoiding any such confusion.171  
In deciding that the registrant was not making a legitimate use of the 
relevant domain names, the panelist drew a distinction between the 
domain names themselves and the Website contents. 
[R]espondent may well, and likely does, have extensive rights of 
free speech to provide a platform to criticize Complainant and a 
right to the fair use of the Complainant’s marks in so doing. The 
contents of Respondent’s websites may also be a perfectly 
legitimate use of those rights. But Respondent could well have 
chosen to use a domain name that was not confusingly similar to 
 
 
 164. For example, the arbitration panel in Estée Lauder, Inc. v. Hanna, WIPO Arbitration and 
Mediation Center, Case No. D2000-0869 ¶ 6B (Sept. 25, 2000), noted that the respondent was alleged 
to be a cybersquatter because he had registered multiple domain names (even though this is not a 
UDRP bad faith factor). This may be contrasted with cases where a UDRP arbitration panel considers 
legitimate interest factors that are not expressly set out in the UDRP or in the ACPA and are likely to 
be of more benefit to the domain name registrant. See, e.g., Bridgestone Firestone Inc. v. Myers, 
WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Case No. D2000-0190 ¶ 6 (July 6, 2000) (acknowledging 
that free speech may be a legitimate interest factor even though not expressly listed in the terms of the 
UDRP). 
 165. WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Case No. D2000-0869 (Sept. 25, 2000). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. ¶ 4C. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. ¶ 5. 
 171. Id. ¶ 6B. 
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Complainants and/or in which Complainant has no rights; it 
intentionally chose not to do so . . . . Respondent’s free expression 
rights do not here give it a right or legitimate interest in the domain 
names at issue.172  
This statement may be contrasted with the decision of a UDRP 
arbitration panel in Bridgestone Firestone v. Myers.173 As with the Estée 
Lauder decision, the panel in Bridgestone accepted a right to free 
expression as a legitimate interest contemplated under the UDRP.174 
However, unlike the Estée Lauder decision, the arbitrator in Bridgestone 
felt that the use of a domain name corresponding with a well-known mark 
for the purposes of a gripe site with no obvious commercial motive would 
not justify a decision to transfer the name to the mark holder.175 The 
registrant, an ex-employee of the complainant, had registered 
www.bridgestone-firestone.net which corresponded with the 
complainant’s marks.176 In terms of the argument that the registrant sought 
commercial profit because the Website in question contained an offer to 
transfer the domain name to the complainants, the arbitrator felt that 
commercial sale was not the registrant’s primary purpose in registering or 
using the name.177 Thus, there was no bad-faith registration or use.178 
The arbitrator was clearly mindful of the delicate balance necessary to 
promote free speech on the Internet while at the same time protecting 
legitimate trademark interests in online commerce. In recognizing the 
importance of preserving freedom of expression in the global Internet 
context, the arbitrator noted:  
Although free speech is not listed as one of the [UDRP’s] examples 
of a right or legitimate interest in a domain name, the list is not 
exclusive, and the Panel concludes that the exercise of free speech 
for criticism and commentary . . . demonstrates a right or legitimate 
 
 
 172. Id. This reasoning is somewhat similar to pre-ACPA reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in 
Toeppen, where it held that a domain name is more than just a Web address and that a mark holder’s 
customers may be discouraged if they cannot find its Web presence by typing its name into the URL at 
the top of a Web browser, rather than into a search engine. Panavision Int’l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 
(9th Cir. 1998). Admittedly that case involved the use of a domain name actually corresponding with 
the plaintiff’s mark whereas the Estée Lauder arbitration is a case of typo-piracy where the registrant 
used a deliberate misspelling of the complainant’s name as its domain name. However, the underlying 
reasoning between Estée Lauder and Toeppen seems comparable. 
 173. WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Case No. D2000-0190 (July 6, 2000). 
 174. Id. ¶ 6. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
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interest in the domain name under Paragraph 4(c)(iii). The Internet 
is above all a framework for global communication, and the right to 
free speech should be one of the foundations of Internet law.179  
In this light, the arbitrator did not feel that registrants wanting to 
establish gripe sites should be restricted to particular iterations of 
trademarks in their domain names, such as www.trademarksucks.com, to 
designate a site for criticism or commentary.180 However, the decision is 
somewhat murky in that it is not clear that the arbitrator would have been 
favorably disposed to a gripe site operator using a .com gTLD, as opposed 
to .net or .org.  
In the cybersquatting cases, the domain names in question generally 
were trademark.com domain names, which prevented the trademark 
holder from utilizing the customary commercial domain name for 
its “official” site . . . . Here, however, the domain name registrant 
has not usurped the <.com> domain, but has utilized only the <.net> 
domain, has posted disclaimers on the website homepage, and has 
included criticism and commentary on the site so that a reasonably 
prudent Internet user can tell that the site is not the trademark 
holder’s “official” site.181  
Here, the arbitrator seems to be suggesting a presumption that the use 
of a .com gTLD corresponding to a trademark will be in bad faith while 
the use of any other gTLD will not necessarily support such a 
presumption.  
Since there are now seven generic top level domains, with more in 
the process of being approved, as well as some 240 country top 
level domains, there are hundreds of domain name permutations 
available to Complainants. Respondent’s use of one of those 
permutations other than the principle <.com> domain name for 
purposes of critical commentary is a legitimate noncommercial and 
fair use.182 
 
 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. The arbitrator further cited the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case of Avery Dennison 
Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 880–81 (9th Cir. 1999), which held that .net generally applies to 
networks and .com generally applies to commercial entities, so a factfinder might infer that trademark 
dilution does not occur with a .net registration. This is another good example of a UDRP arbitrator 
looking to domestic trademark law for guidance on principles of good-faith versus bad-faith 
registration and use. 
 182. Bridgestone, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Case No, D2000-0190 at ¶ 6. 
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This may, in fact, be a sensible suggestion and is considered in more 
detail in the following sections. One downside is that it does relegate those 
wanting to comment on a particular mark holder to a lesser domain space 
than the mark holder. Assuming that Internet users will find sites by 
guessing at domain names rather than using search engines, gripe site and 
parody site operators can potentially reach a larger audience if they can 
use .com versions of names than if they are relegated to other gTLDs.  
How, then, to reconcile Estée Lauder and Bridgestone? The Estée 
Lauder panel based the distinction on the fact that the registrant in 
Bridgestone had only registered a .net version of the relevant name 
whereas the registrant in Estée Lauder had entered the .com arena.183 
However, the Bridgestone decision in and of itself does not in practice 
create an effective protection for free speech because, as noted above, 
UDRP arbitrations are not the end of the story if the aggrieved party at the 
end of the dispute wants to continue in a domestic court. In particular, the 
Bridgestone panel expressly acknowledged that the UDRP does not allow 
for a formal hearing of a trademark dilution claim that was also alleged 
against the registrant by the complainant.184 Thus, the victory at arbitration 
may have been a minor hurdle for the registrant facing a potential 
trademark dilution claim. Even a threatening post-arbitration letter from 
the complainant referring to its potential for a successful dilution suit 
could have chilled the registrant’s speech. 
An attempt to balance free speech with commercial trademark interests 
in the domain space must involve a policy that encompasses the 
application of all relevant parts of trademark law. It would be pointless to 
clarify the confusions underlying the ACPA and the UDRP in the hope of 
promoting a better balance between trademarks and free speech while 
allowing the balance to be destroyed by an overzealous application of 
traditional trademark infringement and/or dilution laws. This must be kept 
in mind while considering the various options for future development 
described below. The following discussion is not necessarily intended to 
be comprehensive or decisive. Rather, its aim is to draw together the 
various threads of ideas that have been suggested in prior cases and 
 
 
 183. Estée Lauder, Inc. v. Hanna, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Case No. D2000-0869 
¶ 6C (Sept. 25, 2000) (“One salient difference with the case at hand is that in Bridgestone the 
Respondent had registered the “net” domain name only, and this was an important factor in the Panel 
conclusion that . . . Respondent was not misleadingly diverting internet users to his site. Here, 
Respondent had registered and linked both the “net” and “com” versions of a name confusingly similar 
to that of Complainant’s marks in order to enhance the possibilities of diversion.”). 
 184. Bridgestone, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Case No. D2000-0190 at ¶ 6. 
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arbitrations involving domain names and to try and identify some potential 
avenues for future legal and regulatory development on this basis.  
III. DOMAIN NAMES AND FREE SPEECH: STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE 
A. “Zoning” Speech in Cyberspace 
One possibility for better balancing free speech interests against 
trademark interests in the domain space would be a kind of “zoning” of the 
domain space along the lines suggested by the UDRP arbitrator in 
Bridgestone. This might involve recognizing a rule that trademark holders 
are entitled to the most obvious .com versions of their trademarks in the 
domain space,185 and those wishing to comment on trademark holders 
should be relegated to a different gTLD, such as .net or .org. Some courts 
and arbitrators have already arguably begun to accept such a rule.186 There 
might be other permutations of such an approach, such as creating special 
new gTLDs specifically for gripe sites and parodies, such as .sucks, 
.stinks, .bites, .fun, or .humor. If this were done, a rule could be instituted 
that trademark holders could claim all of the standard gTLDs, including 
.net and .org, while commentators could be relegated to the new gTLDs.  
Yet another variation of this approach is that rejected by the UDRP 
arbitrator in Bridgestone: to require those wanting to establish gripe sites 
or parody sites to use domain names such as www.trademarksucks.com.187 
Unlike the first variation described above, this would require no change to 
the domain name registration system in that there would be no need to 
create any new gTLDs. There would also be no need to keep 
commentators out of the .com domain space provided that they included 
pejorative terms like sucks, stinks, or perhaps parody, fun, or humor as 
part of the domain name.188 
 
 
 185. In particular, they would be entitled to trademark.com versions of their marks. 
 186. See Bridgestone, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Case No. D2000-0190 at ¶ 6 
(citing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868 (9th 
Cir. 1999), which held that .net generally applies to networks and .com generally applies to 
commercial entities, so a factfinder might infer that trademark dilution does not occur with a .net 
registration).  
 187. Id. ¶ 6 (“The Panel sees no reason to require domain name registrants to utilize 
circumlocutions like www.trademarksucks.com to designate a website for criticism or consumer 
commentary.”). 
 188. Indeed, such an approach would find support, at least in the parody context, from the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals decision in People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 
F.3d 359, 366–67 (4th Cir. 2001). There, the court suggests that for a parody to succeed, the parody 
message must be conveyed simultaneously with representation of the mark in question; thus, a Website 
parody that appears under a direct representation of a trademark, such as peta.org, will not satisfy this 
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This kind of zoning approach to balancing trademark rights and speech 
interests in the domain space has a number of advantages. For one thing, 
adopting any of the above variations on this approach would create clear 
rules for trademark infringement. These rules could cleanly cut across all 
possible trademark-based actions, including infringement, dilution, and 
claims under the ACPA and the UDRP. Thus, if the domain name 
registrant had utilized an appropriate domain zone for her activities, there 
would a presumption against any kind of trademark-based infringement, 
whereas if the registrant had utilized an unuathorized zone for criticism or 
commentary, there could be a presumption of infringement.  
Of course, the latter assertion does not necessarily follow from the 
former. Creating free speech zones in cyberspace does not mean that 
utilizing a non-designated zone would automatically result in a trademark 
infringement. Presumably, a registrant with the choice between a safe 
speech zone and a protected trademark zone who chose the latter could 
still argue noninfringement on the basis that she was not causing confusion 
or dilution, and had not registered the domain name in bad faith for a 
profit motive. For example, a registrant who chose nike.com or nike.net 
for a gripe site, as opposed to nike.sucks, or perhaps nikesucks.com, might 
still defend a trademark infringement action if she could establish that she 
was not confusing consumers or diluting Nike’s mark and had not 
registered the domain name in bad faith for a profit. However, in a system 
with protected speech zones, it might become more difficult for a 
defendant to establish such things. The presumption may well arise that 
the decision not to use a protected speech zone is prima facie evidence of a 
bad-faith intent on the part of the registrant. 
Under such a system, judicial and arbitral decisions would presumably 
be much easier, to the extent that claims were litigated at all. If a person 
registered a domain name in a protected speech zone, it would not be 
necessary for courts and arbitrators to make such complex determinations 
about bad-faith profit motives or consumer confusion. The presumption 
would be that the use of the protected zone would negate these claims 
because consumers would not likely be confused by the use of a trademark 
in a known commentary zone. Trademarks would not be diluted by their 
use in such a zone, and it would presumably be a showing of good faith, 
rather than bad faith, on the part of the registrant to utilize such a zone. 
Even if a registrant utilized the Website in question for some level of 
 
 
notion of parody, whereas a simultaneous communication of the two messages, such as 
petaparody.org, presumably would satisfy this test. 
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profit, such as referring to a preference for competitors of the targeted 
mark holder, this should not be sufficient to show consumer confusion or 
dilution in a known free speech zone. 
However, the disadvantages of such a scheme might outweigh the 
advantages of clarity and certainty. For one thing, it seems distasteful as a 
matter of policy to zone speech. There is no obvious analogue to this in the 
physical world. We do not generally create zones in the physical world 
where people are and are not allowed to express opinions on particular 
issues, other than in cases where speech interests clash with private 
property interests.189 In the real world, private property interests do not 
always trump speech interests,190 and, even to the extent that they do, do 
we want the Internet to become too much like a private property model? 
Over the years, there have been many objections to making online 
locations too much like real property.191 Do we want ownership of a 
trademark to mean that the mark holder also owns one or more domain 
spaces and all content attached to them? Or would we rather conceptualize 
the Internet as a global communications medium where free speech plays a 
foundational role?192 
The other obvious problem with the system described above is that it 
relegates speech to lesser zones than trademark interests. Assuming that 
domain names will continue to have some use as search tools,193 it is more 
 
 
 189. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 
U.S. 501 (1946); State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971). These cases involve courts balancing rights 
to free speech in various contexts with private property rights in the physical world, with courts 
occasionally carving out exceptions to what otherwise might be thought of as almost absolute real 
property rights for purposes of expressing messages or accessing a particular audience for specific 
information. 
 190. Id. 
 191. For a detailed discussion on arguments for and against this point of view, see Michael A. 
Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1 (2004); Dan 
Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 503 
(2003); Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV. 521 (2003); Jacqueline Lipton, 
Information Property: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L. REV. 135 (2004); Jacqueline Lipton, 
Mixed Metaphors in Cyberspace: Property in Information and Information Systems, 35 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 235 (2003); Alfred C. Yen, Western Frontier or Feudal Society?: Metaphors and Perceptions of 
Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1207, 1209 (2002). 
 192. See, e.g., Bridgestone-Firestone, Inc. v. Myers, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, 
Case No. D2000-0190 ¶ 6 (July 6, 2000) (“The Internet is above all a framework for global 
communication, and the right to free speech should be one of the foundations of Internet law.”). The 
United States Government recently endorsed the importance of free speech in cyberspace in the Global 
Online Freedom Bill introduced into the 109th Congress on February 14, 2006. This legislation does 
not specifically relate to domain name disputes but refers to broader government interests in free 
speech in an online context. 
 193. See Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507, 
543–50 (describing the use of domain names as search tools and suggesting that they will be used less 
often as search engines become more sophisticated). 
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likely that a user looking for information about a business will type its 
trademark followed by .com into a web browser, rather than some 
pejorative variation on the mark. Thus, a commentator on a particular 
business is likely to receive a lesser audience if forced to use a speech 
zone indicator than if she were allowed to use a standard gTLD version of 
the relevant mark, perhaps including the .com version.  
One might also question whether this kind of system really adds much 
to the current state of affairs. It is arguably the case now that people 
wishing to parody or criticize trademark holders can use pejorative 
variations of marks in domain names, at least in existing domain 
spaces194—that is, putting to one side the possibility of creating new 
gTLDs such as .sucks for commentary sites. However, there has been 
some confusion in recent years as to whether registrants utilizing 
pejorative suffixes in domain names are free from trademark infringement 
liability. In a recent UDRP arbitration involving the Air France trademark, 
a UDRP arbitration panel split on this question.195 The majority panelists 
held that the domain name airfrancesucks.com for a complaint and 
commentary website was sufficiently confusing to consumers to justify an 
order for the name to be transferred to Air France.196 The dissenting 
panelist disagreed on the consumer confusion point.197 Thus, a clear rule to 
zone speech into domain name zones utilizing particular suffixes would 
lessen such confusion, even though it is subject to the criticisms identified 
above. 
B. Revising the Tests for Trademark Infringement 
1. Traditional Trademark Infringement 
In addition to the approaches based on zoning the domain space 
described above, another possible approach to achieving a better balance 
of speech and trademark interests in the gripe site and parody context 
would be to clarify some of the current tests for infringement of trademark 
laws in these kinds of cases. This could be achieved concurrently with the 
 
 
 194. See, e.g., Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
In this case, the court found that a gripe site utilizing “ballysucks” as part of its domain name did not 
infringe the plaintiff’s mark. However, the domain name in question was not a direct transcription of 
the Bally mark with ‘sucks’ attached—rather, it was www.compupix.com/ballysucks, a subpage of a 
website with a domain name that did not correspond to Bally’s mark. 
 195. Societé Air France v. Virtual Dates, Inc., WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Case No. 
D2005-0168 (May 24, 2005). 
 196. Id. ¶¶ 6–7. 
 197. Id. at dissent. 
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zoning model described above, or as a stand-alone approach. As noted in 
the earlier parts of this discussion, there are three types of actions available 
under the Lanham Act that may implicate free speech in the gripe site and 
parody context: traditional trademark infringement, dilution, and ACPA 
infringement. There is also the possibility of a complaint being brought by 
a mark holder under the UDRP.  
All of these avenues have created different problems for the balance of 
speech interests against trademark interests, so it is necessary to consider 
them separately to work out how they might be revised to better take 
account of speech interests. It may be that some general guidelines can be 
developed that cut across all these actions—such as creating a policy as to 
whether trademark holders should be entitled to .com versions of domain 
names corresponding letter for letter with their mark (trademark.com 
names). However, some more specific guidelines ultimately may need to 
be developed for the individual peculiarities of the different actions, for 
example, by streamlining the notion of bad faith under the ACPA. 
For traditional trademark infringement, the domain name registrant 
must have created, or at least be creating a potential for, consumer 
confusion.198 The problem in cyberspace is that it is often unclear, with 
respect to parody sites and gripe sites, how to determine whether 
consumer confusion is likely to exist as a result of a domain name 
registrant’s activities. In People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. 
Doughney,199 for example, it would seem that consumers interested in the 
ideas and services of PETA likely would not be confused by Doughney’s 
peta.org Website. Yet, the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals were prepared to find a 
likelihood of consumer confusion.200 This judicial practice has not been 
uncommon in such cases where courts are relying increasingly on a notion 
of initial interest confusion,201 even where consumers are not actually 
confused as to source by the Website in question.  
 
 
 198. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a)(1) (2000). 
 199. 113 F. Supp. 2d 915 (E.D. Va. 2000); aff’d 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Goldman, supra note 193, at 559 (“[Initial interest confusion] lacks a rigorous definition, a 
clear policy justification, and a uniform standard for analyzing claims. With its doctrinal flexibility, [it] 
has become the tool of choice for plaintiffs to shut down junior users who have not actually engaged in 
misappropriative uses.”). See also Brookfield Commc’ns v. Coast Entm’t, 174 F.3d 1036, 1054–64 
(9th Cir. 1999); Panavision Int’l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that consumers 
would not actually have been confused as to source by defendant’s Website, but may have been 
distracted from finding the plaintiff’s actual Web presence). 
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However, as noted above, in similar circumstances to Doughney, the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Falwell202 found no trademark 
infringement when the defendant registered a domain name taking 
advantage of a deliberate misspelling of the plaintiff’s surname to criticize 
the plaintiff’s views on homosexuality. The Fourth Circuit distinguished 
its earlier decision in various ways. With respect to the ACPA claim, it 
made a distinction on two grounds: (a) that the defendant in Doughney had 
suggested a willingness to sell the domain name to the plaintiff after the 
litigation commenced; and (b) that the defendant had registered some fifty 
to sixty other domain names corresponding with well-known 
trademarks.203 These factors were said by the court to play into the bad-
faith intent to profit test for ACPA infringement.204 Whether or not this 
analysis bears close scrutiny, the Fourth Circuit’s attempt to distinguish its 
earlier reasoning on consumer confusion for trademark infringement 
purposes seems even more spurious. In Falwell, the Fourth Circuit 
suggests that Doughney is distinguishable in the trademark infringement 
context in that it dealt with a constitutional parody defense to trademark 
infringement, while Falwell is a simple question of consumer confusion.205  
Since parody might be regarded as a subclass of critical speech, it 
seems strange as a matter of policy to subject the two cases to different 
legal tests. Why should a consumer criticism site that is not a parody 
effectively be subject to a lower standard of constitutional scrutiny than a 
criticism site that takes the form of a parody, particularly when both are 
equally unlikely to confuse consumers, and both involved links to other 
Websites where goods or services could be purchased?206 It seems that, 
reading between the lines, maybe the answer lies in the subject matter of 
the relevant speech. Maybe the court felt that a somewhat clumsy parody 
of PETA’s activities did not merit the same constitutional protection as a 
critical stance on the Reverend Jerry Falwell’s views on homosexuality. 
In any event, it may be necessary for the purposes of online trademark 
law to create some clearer judicial or legislative presumptions about the 
use of particular gTLDs containing trademarks. In some ways, it may not 
matter what the presumptions are, as long as they can provide greater 
guidance to those registering and using Internet domain names. A 
 
 
 202. 420 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 203. Id. at 320–21. 
 204. Id. at 320. 
 205. Id. at 316–17. 
 206. In Doughney, the defendant’s website contained links to organizations that sold fur and 
animal products, while in Falwell, the defendant’s website contained a link to a particular book for 
sale on the amazon.com Website. 
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presumption that .com names that correspond letter by letter to a 
trademark (trademark.com names) are reserved to trademark holders and 
may not be used for gripe sites or parody sites would lessen some of the 
current confusion.207 Of course, such a presumption would raise the 
criticisms identified above in relation to relegating commentary to 
particular gTLD speech zones.208  
By the same token, a presumption that a critic who registers any 
domain name corresponding in any way with a trademark, whatever the 
particular gTLD suffix, would not be liable for trademark infringement 
provided that the website included a clear disclaimer on the relevant 
Webpage would also lessen confusion. This would obviously run counter 
to some of the current judicial precedent,209 and it therefore may have to 
be achieved by way of legislation. This approach could be criticized 
because it potentially cuts off rightful trademark holders from an obvious 
domain space.210 However, as the UDRP panel noted in Bridgestone, there 
are many permutations and combinations of relevant domain names that a 
rightful trademark holder can utilize.211 Additionally, a rightful trademark 
holder could always bargain with the registrant for transfer of the name, 
provided that the current law was amended to ensure that such a bargain 
would not create a bad-faith intent to profit from a mark under the 
ACPA.212 
 
 
 207. Of course, disputes could still arise between legitimate trademark holders with similar marks 
over who has the better right to a corresponding domain name. However, resolving such disputes 
raises different issues than balancing commercial interests with free speech interests and is therefore 
beyond the scope of this article. The issue of competitions for domain names between multiple 
legitimate trademark holders is taken up in Beyond Cybersquatting: Taking Domain Name Disputes 
Past Trademark Policy, Lipton, supra note 80, at 1405–13. See also Goldman, supra note 193, at 546 
(suggesting domain name sharing in these kinds of circumstances). 
 208. It also would not, in and of itself, deal with cases of deliberate misspellings of trademarks in 
domain names, such as fallwell.com. 
 209. Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1430, 1441 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 210. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d 915, 919 (E.D. 
Va. 2000), aff’d 263 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir. 2001).  
 211. Bridgestone-Firestone, Inc. v. Myers, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Case No. 
D2000-0190 (July 6, 2000) (“Since there are now seven generic top level domains, with more in the 
process of being approved, as well as some 240 country top level domains, there are hundreds of 
domain name permutations available to Complainants. Respondent’s use of one of those permutations 
other than the principal <.com> domain name for purposes of critical commentary is a legitimate 
noncommercial and fair use.”). Obviously, the suggestion being made in this paper is that it is possible 
to create a workable presumption that even a .com name might be registered and used legitimately by a 
nontrademark holder. This is taking the idea one step further than the arbitrator in Bridgestone, but the 
underlying notion of a variety of options available to the trademark holder is still valid. 
 212. This would also better deal with deliberate misspelling cases because there would be less 
emphasis on the exact spelling of the domain name for the purposes of the presumption, and more 
emphasis on the use of disclaimers on a relevant website, which is arguably an easier question to deal 
with in litigation or arbitration. 
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Either presumption might be justified on policy grounds, and either 
could create greater certainty for users of the domain name system than 
currently exists today. In fact, a mixture of the two could be created by 
following the suggestion of the panel in Bridgestone and reserving .com 
names for commercial trademarks while presuming that other gTLDs are 
open to anyone provided that disclaimers are utilized to avoid consumer 
confusion. However, not all trademark holders will want to avail 
themselves of a .com presence, as they may feel that they are better 
described by a .org or a .net suffix. Some public interest groups may prefer 
a less commercial-looking online presence. Of course, such entities could 
defensively register the .com version of their name and redirect it to 
another website with a .org or .net suffix.  
2. Trademark Dilution 
As is evident from the above discussion, the trademark dilution in 
cyberspace question may really boil down to a consideration of whether a 
particular domain name/Website combination falls within the 
noncommercial use exception to dilution.213 As with a song or movie title, 
it might be presumed that any domain name that corresponds with 
someone else’s mark would appear on its face to be potentially dilutive.214 
If a domain name corresponding to a particular mark resolves to a Website 
that is critical of or humorously parodies the mark holder, this would seem 
obviously to blur or tarnish the reputation of the mark. As noted by Judge 
Kozinski in Mattel, “dilution injunctions . . . lack the built-in First 
Amendment compass of trademark injunctions”215 because dilution does 
not require a showing of consumer confusion. Thus, it would seem 
relatively easy to satisfy the basic element of a dilution claim in 
establishing blurring or tarnishment in a gripe site or parody site context. 
The real question will be whether the use might be excused as a 
noncommercial use even if the domain name registrant conducts some 
kind of commercial activity on the site. Such activity might include 
advertising on the Website or linking to other Websites where products or 
services are sold. If the Mattel reasoning controls here, there is a strong 
 
 
 213. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B) (2000). 
 214. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 904 (9th Cir. 2002) (“To be 
dilutive, use of the mark need not bring to mind the junior user alone. The distinctiveness of the mark 
is diminished if the mark no longer brings to mind the senior user alone.”). Presumably, this reasoning 
could apply by analogy to a use of a domain name for a gripe site or parody site where the goods or 
services of the relevant trademark holder are themselves being parodied on the site. 
 215. Id. at 905. 
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argument that these kinds of situations could be excused as 
noncommercial under the dilution statute. In Mattel, Judge Kozinski noted 
that the congressional purpose was clearly not to prohibit or threaten 
noncommercial speech, including “parody, satire, editorial and other forms 
of expression that are not a part of a commercial transaction.”216 Using 
evidence of this Congressional intent, the judge drew a distinction between 
speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction—purely 
commercial speech—and other speech.217 He favored full First 
Amendment protection for speech that does more than propose a 
commercial transaction.218 This seems a fitting analogy for most gripe 
sites and parody sites, given that the domain names in question will 
generally function much like a song or movie title and that the sites are 
being utilized for speech purposes. This reasoning could potentially 
encompass all domain names, including .com names unless a presumption 
is to be created that would reserve .com names for trademark holders, as 
suggested above.  
As matters currently stand, the extension of trademark dilution into the 
domain space leads to peculiar judicial reasoning that does not further the 
policy aims underlying the dilution statute. In Doughney,219 for example, 
the trial court regarded the following factors as decisively supporting the 
plaintiff’s dilution claim: (a) the defendant used PETA’s trademark in its 
domain name;220 (b) this use caused actual economic harm to the mark by 
lessening its selling power;221 and (c) the defendant also linked his site to 
commercial enterprises engaged in conduct antithetical to the plaintiff’s 
animal rights message.222 It is difficult to see how these factors relate to 
the aims of the dilution statute, which are to protect the famous mark 
against “companies who trade on the renown of the mark by selling 
unrelated goods, such as Kodak pianos or Buick aspirin.”223  
The fact that a defendant uses a plaintiff’s mark in its domain name is 
the very definition of a gripe site or parody site. Utilizing this factor to 
establish dilution, as in Doughney, would be tantamount to a presumption 
that gripe sites and parody sites must be relegated to lesser domains such 
 
 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 906. 
 218. Id. 
 219. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d 915 (E.D. Va. 
2000), aff’d 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 220. Id. at 920. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Lemley, supra note 6, at 1698. 
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as petasucks.org or petaparody.org. Further, the fact that the defendant 
promoted an anti-animal-rights message and linked to other sites selling 
fur and animal products is not the same as the defendant trading off the 
plaintiff’s marks in an unrelated product market. The facts here simply do 
not support the purposes of a dilution claim. The Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Doughney subsequently chose not to rule on the dilution claim, 
having found trademark infringement and ACPA infringement made out 
on the facts.224  
The courts or Congress, with or without the help of ICANN, should 
start putting the brakes on the extension of dilution actions to domain 
name cases. The policy rationale for dilution does not fit the gripe site or 
parody site context, and there are other actions available to protect 
trademark holders against unfair competition on the Internet. In an 
emerging area of both speech and commercial practice, too many 
regulations favoring commerce over commentary should be avoided, 
particularly where the policy basis for the rules is unclear and there are 
other options available to an aggrieved trademark holder. 
3. The ACPA and the UDRP 
The main technical difficulty with applying the ACPA and the UDRP 
in cases involving gripe sites and parody sites is that there is significant 
confusion as to what constitutes bad faith for the purposes of each of these 
regulatory measures outside the traditional cybersquatting context.225 This 
problem is exacerbated under the ACPA by the fact that the legislation is 
drafted in a way that disconnects the bad-faith purpose from the actual 
registration.226 Thus, a subsequent offer to sell the name to a rightful 
trademark holder can technically constitute the requisite bad-faith intent 
even if such a sale was not the registrant’s intent at the time of 
registration.227 Additionally, some of the bad faith factors in the ACPA, 
although not mandatory in a given case, can be confusing when applied to 
gripe sites and parody sites. As noted above, the registration of multiple 
domain names is an obvious example of this.228 A traditional cybersquatter 
would generally register multiple names and not use them for anything in 
particular,229 whereas a gripe site or parody site developer may register 
 
 
 224. Doughney, 263 F.3d at 371 n.3. 
 225. See discussion in Part II.A, B, supra. 
 226. Id. 
 227. See discussion in Part II.A, supra. 
 228. See supra Part II.A. 
 229. One example is Dennis Toeppen’s conduct in registering over one hundred domain names 
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multiple domain names, but will use some or all of the names for speech 
purposes. 
The ACPA and the UDRP were never intended to curtail free 
expression in cyberspace. They were intended to curb the practice of bad-
faith cybersquatting. Their drafting, particularly that of the ACPA, may in 
retrospect prove to be much broader in scope than required to achieve their 
aims. It may now be that some drafting revisions should be adopted to 
clarify that these regulations were not intended to curb legitimate gripe 
sites and parody sites. Failing this, courts and arbitrators may have to take 
a more vigilant stance to protect speech in the domain space than has been 
the case in the past. 
In terms of drafting changes, the ACPA should reflect the fact that it is 
bad-faith registration or acquisition of a domain name that is proscribed 
under the legislation. Simply offering to sell a name to a rightful owner 
subsequent to the onset of a dispute should not be evidence of a bad-faith 
intent to profit under an ACPA claim. Additionally, it is arguable whether 
the list of bad faith factors in the ACPA really adds anything significant to 
the notion of bad-faith intent to profit from registration or use of the name. 
In the early days of the ACPA, these factors arguably gave useful 
guidance to courts and litigants in outlining the kind of conduct that 
traditionally went along with bad-faith cybersquatting.  
However, as noted in the above discussion, today the bad faith factors 
potentially cause some confusion when they are applied outside the 
cybersquatting context. It may be worth removing some or all of the bad 
faith factors from the ACPA, particularly items like the registration of 
multiple domain names, that arguably do not add much to a claim except 
unnecessary complexity. It might be assumed that courts now generally 
have a good idea of what is and what is not traditional cybersquatting and 
that the existence of the list of factors describing this practice, even though 
they are not mandatory in any given claim, are skewing judicial 
interpretations of the ACPA in noncybersquatting cases. As with all 
trademark related claims, it would be extremely useful for the application 
of both the ACPA and the UDRP if a general policy could be developed 
for domain names to clarify whether .com names should be reserved to 
trademark holders. If such a presumption were created, as suggested in the 
Bridgestone arbitration,230 then the registration of a .com name relating to 
 
 
corresponding with well-known marks and not utilizing them for any particular speech purpose. 
 230. Bridgestone Firestone, Inc. v. Myers, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Case No. 
D2000-0190 ¶ 6 (July 6, 2000). 
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a particular mark by someone other than a relevant mark holder could be 
added as a bad faith factor.  
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
There are a number of difficulties currently inherent in trademark law 
and policy in terms of finding an appropriate balance between protecting 
commercial trademark interests and facilitating free speech interests in 
domain names. These difficulties are a result of a number of factors, 
including the general broadening of trademark law in the real world to 
encompass situations outside the traditional consumer confusion context, 
as well as the regulatory reaction to cybersquatting in the 1990s, resulting 
in overbroad regulations that have the potential to chill speech. A number 
of things have to happen on the domestic and international levels to create 
a more balanced framework between trademarks and free speech on the 
Internet.  
One obvious possibility would be to develop laws and policies that 
would scale back trademark infringement actions so they only cover 
situations where there is true consumer confusion and not just initial 
interest confusion.231 In this context, disclaimers placed prominently on 
gripe sites and parody sites should generally suffice to combat a likelihood 
of consumer confusion for trademark infringement purposes. Additionally, 
trademark dilution actions should rarely, if ever, be available for domain 
names utilized for gripe sites and parody sites. There should be a 
presumption that such uses are per se noncommercial for the purposes of 
dilution law.232 Further, the ACPA and the UDRP should be limited to 
cases of clear bad-faith cybersquatting and should not be extended to 
situations involving critical commentary on gripe sites or parody sites. 
It may also be appropriate to start developing some clear presumptions 
about the use of domain names in the gripe site and parody site context. 
There are enough cases and arbitral decisions on record for the major 
policy issues to be identified. It is time to start putting together the 
competing thoughts in this area to develop a clearer policy about 
permissible and impermissible uses of domain names in this context, 
particularly in the .com space and, more particularly, with respect to .com 
names that correspond to a trademark character for character 
(trademark.com names). It would be a good idea to adopt a presumption 
that domain names other than trademark.com names are not per se 
 
 
 231. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 232. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B) (2000). 
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reserved to a relevant trademark holder and can be utilized for gripe sites 
or parody sites provided there is no consumer confusion or trading off the 
trademark holder’s goodwill. This rule could apply to trademarksucks.com 
names as well as to trademark.org and trademark.net names.233 It may be 
augmented by a legislative requirement that a disclaimer be employed on 
such sites to remove any possibility of consumer confusion as to affiliation 
or sponsorship of the site. 
This would leave open the question of trademark.com names, as well 
as potentially .com names involving a deliberate misspelling of a 
trademark, such as fallwell.com. If there is indeed an established practice 
on the Internet of users expecting trademark.com names to belong to 
registered trademark holders, as opposed to, say, trademark.org or 
trademark.net names, then this might justify a presumption of trademark 
infringement where another person registered such a name or a deliberate 
misspelling of such a name. On the other hand, such a presumption does 
raise the concerns identified above.  
When moving forward in any of the directions suggested here, recent 
developments in search engine technology should also be kept in mind. 
Some people would argue that any attempts to streamline trademark law as 
it applies to domain name disputes are a waste of time because of the 
increasing sophistication of search engine technologies and the increasing 
reliance by Internet users on search engines to find targeted sites. 
Professor Goldman has suggested that the ways in which search engines 
are utilized in modern practice “may portend the eventual death of domain 
names”234 and that “top search engine placements have eclipsed domain 
names as the premier Internet locations.”235 However, even if the 
suggestions made in this Article work temporarily and then become 
largely unnecessary in practice, they will still serve two important 
functions. They will help to resolve problems facing society and the courts 
today.236 They will also facilitate discussions about the creation of some 
 
 
 233. This rule follows the line of reasoning suggested by the UDRP panel in Bridgestone, WIPO 
Arbitration and Mediation Center, Case No. D2000-0190 at ¶ 6. 
 234. Goldman, supra note 193, at 548. 
 235. Id.  
 236. Some recent examples include: Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 
2005) (gripe site utilizing plaintiff’s trademark as domain name); Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309 
(4th Cir. 2005) (gripe site/commentary utilizing misspelling of plaintiff’s trademarked name as the 
domain name); Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse, 359 F.3d 806 (6th Cir. 2004) (claim 
under the anticybersquatting provisions of the Lanham Act concerning an Internet gripe site utilizing a 
common law trademark); TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2004) (gripe site case utilizing 
plaintiff’s trademark in domain name); Stenzel v. Pifer, No. C06-492 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32397 
(W.D. Wash. May 22, 2006) (including a plaintiff seeking declaratory judgment that his registered 
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broader principles relating to balancing free speech with trademark rights 
in the Internet context more generally by bringing free speech concerns to 
the forefront of the debate. The creation of new and more balanced 
regulatory principles may help in developing other aspects of Internet 
regulation in the future, including the development of regulations relating 
to the use of trademarks within search engine technologies.237 
Law and policymakers should start thinking about clarifying all of 
these issues. Developing mechanisms that facilitate free speech in the 
domain space is an important next step in the emerging framework for 
Internet regulation. The mechanisms suggested here would avoid chilling 
critical commentary about trademark holders on the Internet. They would 
also potentially save money in Internet commerce by creating greater 
certainty as to competing interests in domain names and thus avoiding 
protracted and often costly litigation.238 Additionally, and most 
importantly, they would underscore the importance of free speech on the 
Internet as a guiding principle for future Internet regulation.  
 
 
domain name did not infringe the defendant’s trademark rights); Toronto-Dominion Bank v. 
Karpachev, 188 F. Supp. 2d 110 (D. Mass. 2002) (including the registration of multiple domain names 
corresponding to plaintiff’s trademarks by a disgruntled customer of the plaintiff); Ford Motor Co. v. 
2600 Enter., 177 F. Supp. 2d 661 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (finding that trademark law does not prohibit 
unauthorized linking of a noninfringing domain name to the plaintiff’s website utilizing the plaintiff’s 
trademark in its own domain name); Northland Ins. Co. v. Blaylock, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (D. Minn. 
2000) (gripe site case utilizing plaintiff’s trademark in the domain name); People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d 915 (E.D. Va. 2000), aff’d 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 
2001) (alleged parody site utilizing plaintiff’s registered trademark as the domain name). 
 237. For a discussion of increasing problems in applying trademark law to activities of Internet 
search engines, see Dogan & Lemley, supra note 6; Goldman, supra note 193.  
 238. Although the UDRP is intended to save money in this context by keeping domain name 
disputes out of court, the above discussion has demonstrated that the UDRP is aimed more at 
traditional cybersquatting practices than at gripe site and parody site cases. The issues raised in 
disputes involving gripe sites and parody sites are more complex than those raised in traditional 
cybersquatting disputes, so these disputes now tend to end up being litigated more than cybersquatting 
actions. 
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